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Abstract. We construct new functional encryption schemes that combine the access control functionality of attribute-
based encryption with the possibility of performing linear operations on the encrypted data. While such a primitive
could be easily realized from fully fledged functional encryption schemes, what makes our result interesting is the
fact that our schemes simultaneously achieve all the following properties. They are public-key, efficient and can be
proved secure under standard and well established assumptions (such as LWE or pairings). Furthermore, security is
guaranteed in the setting where adversaries are allowed to get functional keys that decrypt the challenge ciphertext.
Our first results are two functional encryption schemes for the family of functions that allow users to embed policies
(expressed by monotone span programs) in the encrypted data, so that one can generate functional keys to compute
weighted sums on the latter. Both schemes are pairing-based and quite generic: they combine the ALS functional
encryption scheme for inner products from Crypto 2016 with any attribute-based encryption schemes relying on the
dual-system encryption methodology. As an additional bonus, they yield simple and elegant multi-input extensions
essentially for free, thereby broadening the set of applications for such schemes. Multi-input is a particularly desir-
able feature in our setting, since it gives a finer access control over the encrypted data, by allowing users to associate
different access policies to different parts of the encrypted data. Our second result builds identity-based functional
encryption for inner products from lattices. This is achieved by carefully combining existing IBE schemes from
lattices with adapted, LWE-based, variants of ALS. We point out to intrinsic technical bottlenecks to obtain richer
forms of access control from lattices. From a conceptual point of view, all our results can be seen as further ev-
idence that more expressive forms of functional encryption can be realized under standard assumptions and with
little computational overhead.
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1 Introduction
Public-key encryption allows the owner of a secret key sk to decrypt any ciphertext created with respect to a corre-
sponding public key pk. At the same time, without sk, one should not be able to extract any information whatsoever
about the encrypted plaintext. This all-or-nothing feature is becoming restrictive nowadays as, in many applications, a
much more fine grained access control to data is required. Functional encryption addresses this need by providing an
encryption mechanism where decryption keys are associated with functions. Specifically, given a ciphertext Enc(m)
and a secret key skf associated to some function f , the holder of skf learns f(m) and nothing else.
Security for functional encryption is formalized via a variant of the standard indistinguishability notion. In a
nutshell, this notion states that an adversary who is allowed to see secret keys corresponding to functions f1, . . . fn
should not be able to say which of the challenge messagesm0 orm1 has been encrypted, as long as fi(m0) = fi(m1),
for all i. This indistinguishability notion has been proposed in [BSW11, O’N10] and shown inadequate for certain,
somewhat complex, functionalities. These authors also suggested an alternative, simulation based, security notion that
however turns out to be impossible to achieve for general functionalities without introducing additional restrictions.
See [BSW11, O’N10] for details.
Since its introduction, functional encryption has attracted a lot of interest. Known results can be broadly catego-
rized as focusing on (1) feasibility results for general functionalities, and on (2) concrete, efficient realizations for re-
stricted functionalities of practical interest. Constructions of the first type are all horrendously inefficient. Also, they ei-
ther rely on quite unstable assumptions (e.g. indistinguishability obfuscation) or impose severe restrictions on the num-
ber of secret keys that can be issued. Constructions of the second type, on the other hand, are known only for the case of
linear functions and quadratic functions. Over the last few years, significant research efforts have been devoted to the
quest of improving these constructions along different directions. For the case of the inner-product functionality (IPFE)
[ABDP15], this meant, for instance, improved security guarantees (e.g. [ALS16, ABDP16, BBL17, CLT18]), function
hiding realizations (e.g. [BJK15, DDM16, DOT18]), multi-input extensions (e.g. [AGRW17, ACF+18]), decentral-
ized schemes (e.g. [CDG+18,ABKW19,LT19,ABG19]), unbounded-size vectors (e.g. [TT18,DP19]) and specialized
variants (e.g. [BCSW19]). For the case of quadratic functions, current schemes are limited to [BCFG17,Gay20] in the
public-key setting. Note that FE for inner products, which is the focus of this work, can be used a building block to
obtain FE for quadratic functions. This fact, implicit in [BCFG17], is made explicit in [Gay20] and in the private-key
variants [AS17, Lin17].
In spite of these efforts, only a few convincing practical applications of the primitive have been proposed so far.
Notable examples include the recent non interactive protocol for hidden-weight coin flips from [CS19], a practical con-
struction of function-hiding inner product FE with applications such as in biometric authentication, nearest-neighbor
search on encrypted data in [KLM+18], an application of functional encryption for quadratic functions for performing
private inference on encrypted data in [RPB+19].
A possible explanation for this is that, behind its charming theoretical appearance, functional encryption hides a
fragile and potentially dangerous nature: each new released secret key inherently leaks information. This becomes
particularly painful for the case of inner products, as, when encrypting plaintexts of length, say, n, holding n secret
keys allows, in general, to recover the full plaintext completely. While this might seem inherent in the nature of
IPFE, one might wonder if additional measures might be put in place to reduce leakage and make the primitive more
appealing for applications. Think for instance of the case of a medical database. To preserve privacy while maintaining
the possibility of performing simple descriptive statistics (such as the weighted mean) on the data, one might decide
to encrypt the database using IPFE. A drawback of this solution, however, is that the confidentiality of the whole
database is compromised if a sufficiently large number of different keys is released. This is problematic since this
threshold might be easy to reach when many users access the database.
A natural way to limit the inherent information leakage of existing IPFE schemes would be to use FE primitives
with more sophisticated functionalities. Ideally, this primitive should allow to embed access policies in the (encrypted)
data while allowing to compute weighted sums on the latter. More precisely, each key should allow to obtain the
desired inner product only when some appropriate access policy is satisfied. Going back to our medical example, this
means that the confidentiality of a particular database entry would be compromised only if sufficiently many different
keys satisfying the ciphertext policy associated with that entry are released.
Another way to look at the question, is providing additional security guarantees with respect to basic identity or
attribute based encryption schemes. These typically control who is authorized to decrypt the data. Still, once the data
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is accessed, no additional control is possible: authorized users get the full information, while others get nothing. In this
sense, it is natural to consider encryption primitives that, beyond access control, also permit to more carefully tune the
information leakage.
Notice that the mechanisms above are easy to realize if one is willing to resort to functional encryption schemes
for general functionalities. The trouble with this is that such a solution would be of little (if any) practical interest. Our
goal, on the other hand, is to develop a scheme that implements the features above while retaining as much as possible
all the nice properties of currently known IPFEs.
This motivates the following question.
Is it possible to develop an efficient, public-key, functional encryption scheme that allows users both to embed access
policies in the encrypted data and to generate decryption keys to compute inner products on the data?
A trivial generic approach. Since ABE and IPFE are both well-studied primitives, the first natural question is
whether we can easily combine existing schemes to achieve our target notion. In the target scheme, each ciphertext
is associated with a predicate P and encrypts a vector ~x. Each functional decryption key sk~y,att is associated with an
attribute att and a vector ~y. Decryption recovers 〈~x, ~y〉 if P(att) = 1. If it is not the case, no information about ~x
should be revealed.
Now, consider the approach of encrypting a plaintext via an IPFE and then encrypting the resulting ciphertext
via the ABE. This is not secure against collusions as, once the outer ciphertext is decrypted, the inner one becomes
completely independent from the ABE. To see why, assume we have keys for sk~y0,att0 and sk~y1,att0 and a ciphertext ct,
encrypting a vector ~x under the predicate P such that P(att0) = 1 and P(att1) = 0. The trivial solution allows to use
sk~y0,att0 to obtain the original IPFE ciphertext, which can then be used with sk~y1,att1 to obtain 〈~x, ~y1〉 (even though
we should only have been able to compute 〈~x, ~y0〉). This means that mix-and-match attacks are possible. In fact, there
seems to be no trivial solution to this problem.
Another trivial generic approach. One other approach to limit the leakage is by encrypting various databases under
a different IPFE public key for every recipient. Apart from the fact that this leads to a prohibitive blow-up in size, it
would not be possible to agregate data between different databases. Our solution has neither of these limitations and
ensures that the ciphertext size is independent of the number of potential recipients.
Our contributions. In this paper, we construct schemes for inner-product functional encryption with fine-grained ac-
cess control. Our realizations are both efficient and provably secure under standard and well-established assumptions.
The key distinguishing feature of our constructions is that they can be proved secure in the, technically more
challenging, setting where the adversary is allowed to (get keys to) decrypt the challenge ciphertext. Let us explain this
more in detail. Popular specializations of functional encryption (such as identity-based encryption (IBE) [Sha84,BF01]
and attribute-based encryption [SW05, GPSW06]) are ones where the message is interpreted as a pair (I,m), where
m is the actual message (often called the “payload”) and I is a string, referred to as the index (or in the context of
ciphertext-policy ABE [BSW07], a predicate), that can be either public or private. For these schemes, confidentiality
of the payload is guaranteed as long as no decryption keys associated with attributes that satisfy the predicate are issued.
In our case, we still guarantee a meaningful security notion when keys which allow users to decrypt the payload are
issued.
Private-index schemes also provide meaningful security guarantees when keys that decrypt are leaked, namely,
they still hide the index in that case. However, as opposed to public-index schemes, for which we have constructions
for all circuits from standard assumptions [GVW13,BGG+14], such schemes can only handle restrictive policies, that
are expressed by orthogonality testing (also referred to as inner-product encryption [KSW08]), or assume a weaker
security property, called weak attribute hiding, which limits the set of keys that the adversary can get. Namely, this
property dictates that the adversary is only allowed to ask secret keys corresponding to functions that cannot be used
to decrypt the challenge ciphertext. As observed in [GVW15], a fully attribute-hiding predicate encryption for circuits
would bring us tantalizing close to getting indistinguishability obfuscation, which explains why they are much harder
to realize in practice.
We consider both public-index schemes where policies are expressive (they can be expressed by monotone span
programs, which capture Boolean formulas), and private-index schemes for orthogonality testing (which captures
constant depth Boolean formulas). In both settings, we permit a fine-tuned access to the payload, which, from a
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technical point of view, involve providing security even when the adversary obtains keys that decrypt the challenge
ciphertext (even in the public-index case).
IP-FE WITH FINE-GRAINED ACCESS CONTROL FROM PAIRINGS. Our first main result is the construction of func-
tional encryption schemes for the family of functions that allows users to embed policies on the encrypted data, so
that one can generate decryption keys that computes weighted sums on the latter. More precisely, in our schemes, each
ciphertext is associated with a predicate P and encrypts a (small norm) vector ~x. Each functional decryption key is
associated with an attribute att and a (small norm) vector ~y. Decryption recovers 〈~x, ~y〉 if att satisfies P. If this is not
the case, security guarantees that no information about ~x is revealed.
Our constructions are quite generic and show that it is possible to combine existing pairing-based attribute-based
encryption with the IPFE from [ALS16]. Our construction relies on any attribute-based encryption that uses the dual-
system encryption methodology [Wat09]. In particular, we provide a modular framework that turns any ABE that
supports the class of predicates P into a functional encryption scheme for the functions described by an attribute
att ∈ U and a vector ~y, that given as input a vector ~x and a predicate P ∈ P , outputs 〈~x, ~y〉 if P(att) = 1 and ⊥
otherwise. For correctness to hold we require that both ~x and ~y are vectors of polynomially-bounded dimension and
norm. We consider both the case where the policy P associated with a ciphertext is public, or at the contrary, remains
hidden. As explained previously, leveraging state of the art pairing-based ABE, we obtain an FE for P described by
monotone span programs, and an FE for P for any constant depth formula, where the formula itself remains hidden.
From a technical point of view, our first realization combines the IPFE from [ALS16] with any predicate encoding
for prime-order pairing groups. In a nutshell, predicate encodings [Wee14, Att14] are a one-time secure, private key,
statistical variant of ABE that are much simpler to construct and to deal with. The resulting construction achieves
simulation security, but only in a selective sense, and unfortunately this happens to be the case even if the underlying
building blocks achieve adaptive security. Informally, this comes from the fact that our security model explicitly allows
the adversary to (get keys to) decrypt the challenge ciphertext. Technically, this means that, throughout the security
proof, only functional decryption keys associated with pairs (att, ~y) for which P∗(att) = 0 can be turned into semi-
functional ones (here P∗ denotes the predicate chosen by the adversary for the challenge ciphertext). Following the
dual-system encryption methodology, semi-functional keys refer to keys that cannot decrypt successfully the challenge
ciphertext, but can decrypt correctly any other honestly generated ciphertext. Keys for which P∗(att) = 1 cannot be
turned semi-functional as otherwise they would fail to (correctly) decrypt the challenge ciphertext. Such a decryption
issue does not arise in typical ABE settings, as their security model explicitly prevents the adversary to decrypt the
challenge ciphertext.
Our second construction circumvents this difficulty and obtains adaptive security by generalizing the techniques
introduced in [OT12], later improved in [CGW18] in the context of fully-hiding predicate encryption for inner product
testing. Indeed, in fully-hiding predicate encryption, the proof also has to explicitly deal with the decryption issue
sketched above. To do so, we introduce the notion of function encoding, which is the analogue of predicate encoding
for functional encryption. Recall that predicate encodings, introduced in [Att14,Wee14], are a “dumbed-down” version
of ABE, and provide a framework to extend the dual system encryption methodology introduced by [Wat09] in the
context of adaptively-secure IBE to a broad class of ABE, including inner product testing, or Boolean formulas. In
our case, we use the abstraction of function encoding to generalize the information-theoretic argument from [CGW18]
to capture a broad class of functional encryption, including inner-product FE with access control expressed by inner-
product testing, Boolean formulas, and more.
Similarly to predicate encoding, which has received significant interest (particularly as its more general form
referred to as Conditional-Disclosure of Secret, e.g. [GIKM00,GKW15,AARV17,LVW17]), we believe the notion of
function encoding could be interesting on its own.
In a nutshell, functional encodings enhance a more sophisticated information theoretic argument than traditional
Dual System Encryption, where secret keys are switched to a semi-functional mode that still allows them to decrypt
the challenge ciphertext, but yield different information than normally generated secret keys. Indeed, in the security
proof, the ciphertext will encode the original message ~x0, but also the message ~x1, where the pair (~x0, ~x1) is chosen by
the adversary during the indistinguishability game. Normal keys will decrypt with respect to the message ~x0, whereas
the semi-functional keys will decrypt with respect to the message ~x1, thereby successfully proving security.
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IDENTITY-BASED INNER-PRODUCT FE FROM LATTICES. Our second main result is the construction of two identity-
based inner-product FE (IB-IPFE) from the LWE assumption6. Both schemes combine existing LWE-based IBE with
the LWE-based inner-product FE from [ALS16]. The first one uses the IBE from [GPV08], where the public key
described a trapdoor function for which it is hard to sample short preimage. Given the trapdoor— the master key of the
IBE— it is possible to efficiently compute a short preimage of any target image. Each identity id yielding a different
image, the corresponding preimage, a matrix of short coefficients ~Mid, defines the user secret key for id. As it turns out,
to produce functional decryption keys associated with identity id and vector ~y, we can simply give a projection ~Mid~y.
We prove this remarkably simple scheme adaptively-secure in the random oracle model using the security argument
of [GPV08] to handle all functional decryption keys that do not decrypt the challenge ciphertext, whereas we use the
proof techniques of [ALS16] to take care of all keys that decrypt the challenge ciphertexts.
Our second constructions relies on the IBE from [ABB10], where the public key can be used to derive an identity-
based public key pkid for any identity id. The public key pkid describes a trapdoor function, for which, as in [GPV08],
it is hard to compute short preimages. A fixed target image, which belongs to the range of all the trapdoor functions
pkid is made public. The user secret key for id is a short preimage of the fixed target image, for the function pkid. Once
again, user secret keys happen to be matrices, which can be projected to obtain functional decryption keys skid,~y and
get an IB-IPFE.
As a bonus, our schemes inherit the anonymity property of the underlying IBE, that is, the identity associated with
a ciphertext remains hidden as long as no functional decryption key that decrypts is issued.
RICHER ACCESS CONTROL FROM LATTICES. The puncturing technique that is used in the security proof of [ABB10]
has been generalized to obtain ABE for all circuits in [BGG+14]. However, there are intrinsic technical limitations
in our proof strategy which prevent from extending our scheme to the ABE case. In particular, to use the security
argument of the IPFE from [ALS16] as part of our own security proof, we rely on a lazy sampling argument: to obtain
a functional decryption key skid?,~y where id
? is the identity of the challenge ciphertext, we first sample a matrix with
short coefficients ~Mid? and set the fixed public target image such that this short matrix is a preimage of the target
image by the function described by the public key pkid? . Concretely, the target image is a matrix ~T , the public key
pkid = ~Aid? is also a matrix, and we want ~Aid? ~Mid? = ~T , where the matrices have matching dimensions. We can first
sample ~T , then use the trapdoor to compute ~Mid? satisfying the previous equation, but we can also first sample a short
~Mid? , and then set ~T = ~Aid? ~Mid? . This produces identically distributed matrices, and in the latter case, we can produce
~Mid? without knowing the trapdoor, which is necessary in the security proof. The matrix ~Mid? will actually correspond
to the master secret key of the IPFE of [ALS16]. The key skid?,~y is ~Mid?~y, as described above, which corresponds to
a functional decryption key for ~y in the scheme from [ALS16]. However, this lazy sampling argument is inherently
limited to the case where only one attribute (here, identity) satisfies the predicate (here, identity) of the challenge
ciphertext. In the case of ABE, there can be multiple such attributes for a given predicate. We leave combining ABE
for circuits with inner-product FE as a challenging open problem.
MULTI-INPUT EXTENSIONS. As a final contribution, we show how to generalize our pairing-based IP-FE scheme to
the multi input setting. Our realization is rather generic in the sense that it converts any single input construction of the
primitive, satisfying few additional properties, into a multi input scheme supporting the same class of functionalities.
Specifically, the required properties are that (1) the underlying IP-FE is pairings-based (2) its encryption and key gen-
eration algorithms can take as input large norm vectors and (3) its encryption algorithm enjoys linearly homomorphic
properties. Recall that, to guarantee efficient decryption, our parings based constructions require that both the plaintext
vectors ~x and the function vector ~y have small norm. What we require now is that, if one is willing to give up efficient
decryption, the small norm condition can be relaxed (i.e. decryption returns an encoding of the output rather than the
output itself).
On a technical level the transformation follows very closely the generic single-input to multi-input IP-FE transform
by Abdalla et al. [ACF+18,AGRW17]. In this sense, we believe that the interesting contribution is the primitive itself.
Indeed, information leakage is even more problematic in the multi input setting, as here users can combine their inputs
with many different ciphertexts coming from other users. In the case of n users this easily leads to an information
leakage that completely destroys security. While countermeasures could be put in place to limit the encryption and
key queries that the adversary is allowed to ask, by resorting for instance, to the notion of multi-client IPFE, where
6We stress that both schemes support exponentially large input domains, as for existing LWE-based inner-product FE schemes.
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ciphertexts are associated with time-stamps, and only ciphertext with matching time-stamps can be combined (e.g.
[CDG+18]) we believe that our proposed primitive provides a more general and versatile solution to the problem.
Our construction allows users to compute weighted sums on encrypted vectors each associated with a possibly
different access structure. In our medical example above, this might be used to add even more granularity to the access
control of data. That is, some users may obtain keys that can compute statistics on some, but not all, the encrypted
data. For instance, doctors in a hospital may be able to compute on a different set of encrypted data then employees of
a health insurance company. Moreover, multi-input allows users to aggregate data coming from different sources.
Related Work. We emphasize that the primitive considered in this paper is natural, and as such, it has also been
considered in previous works, either implicitly or explicitly.
In [DP19], Dufour-Sans and Pointcheval describe an identity-based functional encryption scheme for inner prod-
ucts as a byproduct of their realization of unbounded IPFE with succinct keys. Their construction is proven selectively
secure in the random-oracle model based on the standard decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Compared
to their construction, our pairing-based schemes provide support for significantly richer functionalities and are proven
secure in the standard model.
In prior works [AJS18,JLMS19], the authors define a so-called partially-hiding FE allowing for the computation on
two inputs (x, y), where the input x is seen as a public attribute and the other one, y, remains hidden. The construction
of [AJS18] supports degree-2 computation on the private input y, and degree-1 computation on the public input x.
Its security rely on the generic bilinear group model. In [JLMS19], functional secret keys support the computation of
degree-2 polynomials on the private input, as in [AJS18], but it supports NC0 computation on the public input. As an
additional benefit, the security of their construction rely on a standard assumption on pairing groups (namely, SXDH).
In [JLS19], Jain, Lin, and Sahai provided a partially-hiding FE allowing for degree-2 computation on the private input,
and NC1 computation on the public inputs; relying on the SXDH assumption. All of these schemes are in the secret-
key setting. Our scheme has the advantage to be public-key, although our techniques inherently rely on the linearity of
the inner-product functionality. All of those works focus on simulation, selective security, and use partially-hiding FE
in the context of providing indistinguishability obfuscation.
In [CZY19], Chen, Zang, and Yiu propose a construction of attribute-based functional encryption for inner prod-
ucts. Like ours, their construction is pairing-based, but it is less generic, and relies on three decisional assumptions on
bilinear groups of composite order N = p1p2p3 (p1, p2, p3 distinct primes), which are less efficient than prime-order
groups. Our realizations, on the other hand, build generically from any dual system encryption-based ABE. In terms
of security, their construction guarantees indistinguishability against adaptive adversaries in the standard model, but
only in the weaker setting discussed above, where keys that decrypt cannot be leaked to the adversary, which does not
capture the essence of the notion that we achieve, since it does not offer any additional security guarantees with re-
spect to standard ABE schemes. We recall that all our schemes explicitly allow the adversary to get functional keys to
decrypt the challenge ciphertext. Also, while our first scheme is only selectively secure, it achieves this in the stronger
simulation setting. Finally, no extensions to the multi-input case are considered in [CZY19].
In [Wee17], Wee builds partially hiding predicate encryption schemes which simultaneously generalize existing
attribute-based and inner-product predicate encryption schemes. Although his constructions support a larger class of
policies than our constructions, the decryptor still has access to the payload message (a KEM key in this case) once
the access policy is satisfied or to a uniformly random value otherwise. We see it as an interesting open problem to
extend his work to also permit selective computations over the payload message when the access policy is satisfied.
Subsequent work. In [AGW20], Abdalla, Gong, and Wee present functional encryption schemes for attribute-
weighted sums, where encryption takes as inputN attribute-value pairs (xi, zi) where xi is public and zi is private; se-
cret keys are associated with arithmetic branching programs f , and decryption returns the weighted sum
∑N
i=1 f(xi)zi
while leaking no additional information about the zi’s. The functionalities being introduced in this paper can be seen
as a particular case of the new functionality in [AGW20] by setting N = 1. We note, however, that our adaptively
secure construction in Section 3 also allows for private attributes.
In [GJLS20], Gay, Jain, Lin, and Sahai extend the partially-hiding FE scheme in [JLS19] to the public-key setting.
Their new functionality also encompasses the ones being introduced in this paper since it supports the computation of
degree-2 polynomials on the private input.
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Publication note. An abridged version of this paper appears in the proceedings of ASIACRYPT 2020 [ACGU20]. In
addition to including complete proofs of security, this version also describes a lattice-based standard-model construc-
tion of identity-based functional encryption and a multi-input extension of our schemes. Moreover, it also provides
concrete function encodings that correspond to identity-based encryption, inner-product predicate encryption, fully-
hiding inner-product predicate encryption and monotone span programs.
Organization. Section 2 recalls some standard notation together with the syntax and security definitions for func-
tional encryption schemes. Section 3 presents our constructions of inner-product FE with fine-grained access control
from pairings. Section 4 describes our first lattice-based construction of identity-based functional encryption in the
random-oracle model. Section 5 describes the lattice-based standard-model construction of identity-based functional
encryption and Section 6 presents a multi-input extension of our schemes.
2 Preliminaries
Notation. We denote with λ ∈ N a security parameter. A probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm A is a
randomized algorithm for which there exists a polynomial p(·) such that for every input x the running time of A(x) is
bounded by p(|x|). We say that a function ε : N→ R+ is negligible if for every positive polynomial p(λ) there exists
λ0 ∈ N such that for all λ > λ0: ε(λ) < 1/p(λ). If S is a set, x←R S denotes the process of selecting x uniformly at
random in S. IfA is a probabilistic algorithm, y ←R A(·) denotes the process of runningA on some appropriate input
and assigning its output to y. For a positive integer n, we denote by [n] the set {1, . . . , n}. We denote vectors ~x = (xi)
and matrices A = (ai,j) in bold. For a set S (resp. vector ~x) |S| (resp. |~x|) denotes its cardinality (resp. number of
entries). Also, given two vectors ~x and ~x′ we denote by ~x‖~x′ their concatenation. By ≡, we denote the equality of
statistical distributions, and for any ε > 0, we denote by ≈ε the ε-statistical difference of two distributions. For any
x ∈ R, we denote by bxc the largest integer less than or equal to x, while for any z ∈ [0, 1], we denote by bze the
closest integer to z. For all ~ai ∈ Znip for i ∈ [n], we denote by (~a1, . . . ,~an) ∈ Z
∑
i∈[n] ni
p a column vector, and by




p a row vector.
2.1 Pairing groups
Let PGGen be a PPT algorithm that on input the security parameter 1λ, returns a description PG = (G1,G2,GT ,
p, P1, P2, e) where for all s ∈ {1, 2, T}, Gs is an additive cyclic group of order p for a 2λ-bit prime p. G1 and G2
are generated by P1 and P2 respectively, and e : G1 × G2 → GT is an efficiently computable (non-degenerate)
bilinear map. Define PT := e(P1, P2), which is a generator of GT , of order p. We use implicit representation of group
elements. For s ∈ {1, 2, T} and a ∈ Zp, define [a]s = a · Ps ∈ Gs as the implicit representation of a in Gs. More
generally, for a matrix A = (aij) ∈ Zn×mp we define [A]s as the implicit representation of A in Gs:
[A]s :=
a11 · Ps ... a1m · Ps
an1 · Ps ... anm · Ps
 ∈ Gn×ms .
Given [a]1 and [b]2, one can efficiently compute [a · b]T using the pairing e. For matrices A and B of matching
dimensions, define e([A]1, [B]2) := [AB]T . For any matrix A,B ∈ Zn×mp , any group s ∈ {1, 2, T}, we denote by
[A]s + [B]s = [A+B]s.










Definition 2.1 (DDH assumption). For any adversary A, any group s ∈ {1, 2, T} and any security parameter λ, let
AdvDDHGs,A(λ) := |Pr[1← A(PG, [~a]s, [~ar]s)]− Pr[1← A(PG, [~a]s, [~u]s)]|,
where the probabilities are taken over PG ←R GGen(1λ, d), ~a ←R DDH, r ←R Zp, ~u ←R Z2p, and the random coins
of A. We say DDH holds in Gs if for all PPT adversaries A, AdvDDHGs,A(λ) is a negligible function of λ.
Definition 2.2 (SXDH assumption). For any security parameter λ and any pairing group PG = (G1,G2,GT , p, P1,
P2, e)←R PGGen(1λ), we say SXDH holds in PG if DDH holds in G1 and G2.
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2.2 Functional Encryption
Definition 2.3 (Functional Encryption [BSW11, O’N10]). Let F be a family of functions, with f ∈ F defined as
f : X → Y . A functional encryption scheme for F consists of the following algorithms:
– Setup(1λ,F): takes as input the security parameter λ and a description of the function family F , and outputs a
master public key mpk and a master secret key msk. The master public key mpk is assumed to be part of the input
of all the remaining algorithms.
– Enc(x ∈ X ): takes as input the master public key mpk and a message x ∈ X , and it outputs a ciphertext ct.
– KeyGen(msk, f ∈ F): takes as input the master secret key msk, a function f ∈ F , and it outputs a decryption key
skf .
– Dec(skf , ct): takes as input a decryption key skf along with a ciphertext ct, and it outputs a value y ∈ Y or the
special symbol ⊥ if it fails.
A scheme as defined above is correct if for all security parameter λ, x ∈ X , and f ∈ F , we have: Pr[Dec(skf , ctx) =
f(x)] = 1] where the probability is taken over (mpk,msk)← Setup(1λ,F), skf ← KeyGen(msk, f), ctx ← Enc(x).
Partial information. For the rest of this paper, it is convenient to split the output of the function in two parts:
(f(x), part(x)), where part(x) is some partial information on x that is independent from f . For instance, we will
consider the case of x := (P, ~x), where P is a predicate, and ~x ∈ Zd is a vector of dimension d; each function is
described by a pair (att, ~y) where att is an attribute, and ~y ∈ Zd. The output f(x) reveals ~x>~y and P if P(att) = 1;
only P otherwise. Note that the information P is always revealed, no matter the function. Considering this part of the
input separately will be helpful later.
Security notions. We first recall the selective indistinguishability variant for the security of functional encryption
here.
Definition 2.4 (SEL-IND security). For every functional encryption FE , every security parameter λ, every stateful





β′ ← AOKeyGen(·) (mpk, ct?)
Output: β′
where OKeyGen(·) is an oracle that on input f ∈ F , outputs KeyGen(msk, f). Additionally, if A ever calls the oracle
KeyGen on an input f ∈ F , the challenge queries x0, x1 must satisfy: f(x0) = f(x1) and part(x0) = part(x1).
A functional encryption scheme FE is SEL-IND-secure if for every PPT adversary A, the following advantage is
a negligible function of λ:
AdvSEL-INDFE,A (λ) =
∣∣Pr [SEL-INDFE0 (1λ,A) = 1]− Pr [SEL-INDFE1 (1λ,A) = 1]∣∣
Now we give the adaptive, indinstinguishability based variant of security for FE. It is the same as the previous
definition, except the challenge (x0, x1) can be chosen adaptively, after seeing the public key and querying functional
decryption keys.
Definition 2.5 (AD-IND security). For every functional encryption FE , every security parameter λ, every stateful






β′ ← AOKeyGen(·) (mpk, ct?)
Output: β′
where OKeyGen(·) is an oracle that on input f ∈ F , outputs KeyGen(msk, f). Additionally, if A ever calls the oracle
KeyGen on an input f ∈ F , the challenge queries x0, x1 must satisfy: f(x0) = f(x1) and part(x0) = part(x1).
A functional encryption scheme FE is AD-IND-secure if for every PPT adversary A, the following advantage is a
negligible function of λ:
AdvAD-INDFE,A (λ) =
∣∣Pr [AD-INDFE0 (1λ,A) = 1]− Pr [AD-INDFE1 (1λ,A) = 1]∣∣
We now give the simulation-based, selective security. Note that simulation security straightforwardly implies in-
distinguishable security.
Definition 2.6 (SEL-SIM security). For any FE scheme FE for functionality F , any security parameter λ, any PPT











ct? ← Ẽnc(m̃sk, part(x?))
α← AOKeyGen(·)(m̃pk, ct?)
In the real experiment, the key generation oracle OKeyGen, when given as input f ∈ F , returns KeyGen(msk, f). In
the ideal experiment, the key generation oracle OKeyGen, when given as input f ∈ F , computes f(x?), and returns
K̃eyGen(m̃sk, part(x?), f, f(x?)), where part(x?) denotes the partial information on x?.
We say an FE scheme is SEL-SIM secure if for all PPT adversaries A, there exists a PPT simulator S :=
(S̃etup, Ẽnc, K̃eyGen) such that
AdvSEL-SIMFE,A (λ) := |Pr[1← Real
FE
A (1
λ)]− Pr[1← IdealFEA,S(1λ)]| = negl(λ).
3 Inner-Product FE with Fine-grained Access Control
In this section, we present functional encryption schemes for the family of functions that allows users to embed access
policies in the encrypted data, and generate functional decryption keys that compute weighted sum on the latter.
Namely, each ciphertext is associated with a predicate P, and encrypts a vector ~x ∈ [0, B]d for some dimension d and
some bound B. Each functional decryption key is associated with an attribute att and a vector ~y ∈ [0, B]d. Decryption
recovers the inner product ~x>~y ∈ [0, dB2] together with P if the attribute att satisfies the predicate P. Otherwise, it
only recovers the predicate P, but no information about the encrypted vector ~x is revealed.
We show it is possible to combine existing pairing-based ABE together with the inner-product FE from [ALS16].
Our generic construction works on any ABE that relies on the dual system encryption methodology, originally put
forth by [Wat09]. Namely, any such ABE that supports the class of predicates P , can be turned into an FE scheme
for the family Fipfe(d,B),P := U × [0, B]d of functions described by an attribute att ∈ U and a vector ~y ∈ [0, B]d,
that given as input a predicate P ∈ P where P : U → {0, 1} and a vector ~x ∈ [0, B]d, returns ~x>~y ∈ [0, dB2] if
P(att) = 1, 0 otherwise. Note that this can be compactly written as P(att) · ~x>~y. We will consider the case where the
partial information that is leaked about (P, ~x) is P, which corresponds to the case of ABE with public indices, but also
the case where the predicate itself is hidden, which corresponding to the case of predicate encryption, also referred
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to as ABE with private indices. For correctness, we require the bound B and the dimension d to be polynomially
bounded.
We first give a scheme that builds upon any predicate encoding, a one-time secure, private-key, statistical variant
of ABE, introduced in [Wee14, Att14], later refined in [Att16, AC16, AC17, ABS17] for prime-order pairing groups.
Building a predicate encoding is much easier than directly building an attribute based encryption, since the heavy
machinery that is being used to prove security of the resulting ABE is taken care of by these modular frameworks.
We follow this line of work by giving a definition of predicate encoding which is essentially that of [CGW15]. For
simplicity, we leave the question of using more general predicate encodings, such as those from [AC17], which capture
a larger class of ABE, as future work. Our modular construction is general enough to capture identity-based encryption,
inner-product predicate encryption, and monotone span programs, whose concrete predicate encodings are given in
Appendix B.
3.1 FE with simulation, selective security
First, we recall the definition of predicate encodings.
Definition 3.1 (predicate encoding). Let P be a family of predicates and p be a prime. A predicate encoding for
(P,Zp) is given by the following polynomial-time deterministic algorithms:
– Param(P): takes as input the family of predicates P , and returns the parameters (n, |ct|, |sk|) ∈ N3.
– EncCt(P): takes as input a predicate P ∈ P , and returns a matrix C ∈ Zn×|ct|p .
– EncKey(att): takes as input an attribute att ∈ U , and returns a matrix K ∈ Z(n+1)×|sk|p .
– Decode(P, att): takes as input a predicate P ∈ P , an attribute att ∈ U , and returns a vector ~d ∈ Z|ct|+|sk|p .
We require the following properties.
Correctness. If P ∈ P and att ∈ U such that P(att) = 1, C := EncCt(P) ∈ Zn×|ct|p , K := EncKey(att) ∈






~d = (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Zn+1p , where 0 ∈ Z
1×|ct|
p .
Security. If P ∈ P and att ∈ U such that P(att) = 0, then the following are identically distributed:













where α, v1, . . . , vn ←R Zp.
Example: Identity-Based Encryption.
– Param(IBE): takes as input the family of predicates I, where each predicate is described by an identity id ∈ I,
and returns 1 when given as an input an identity id′ such that id′ = id, returns 0 otherwise. It returns the parameters
(n = 2, |ct| = 1, |sk| = 1) ∈ N3.
– EncCt(id): given id ∈ I, returns a matrix C = (1, id) ∈ Z2×1p such that (v1|v2)C = v1 + idv2 ∈ Zp.
– EncKey(id): given id ∈ I, returns a matrix K = (1, 1, id) ∈ Z3×1p such that (α|v1|v2)K = α+ v1 + idv2 ∈ Zp.





Our simulation, selectively secure FE is described in Fig. 1.
Correctness. Observe that for all predicates P ∈ P , the vector [(W>1 ~c1| . . . |W>n~c1)]1 ∈ G2×n1 can be computed from
mpk and the randomness s ←R Zp used by the encryption algorithm to compute [~c1]1 := [~as]1. Then, the encryption
algorithm multiplies the resulting vector by the matrix C := EncCt(P) ∈ Zn×|ct|p to obtain [C2]1 ∈ G2×|ct|1 . Similarly,
for all attributes att ∈ U , the vector [(U~y|W1~k1| . . . |Wn~k1)]2 ∈ G2×(n+1)2 can be computed from mpk, msk, and
9
the randomness r ←R Zp used by the key generation algorithm to compute [~k1]2 := [~br]2. Then, the key generation
algorithm multiplies the resulting vector by the matrix K := EncKey(att) ∈ Z(n+1)×|sk|p to obtain [K2]1 ∈ G2×|sk|2 .
Let P ∈ P and att ∈ U such that P(att) = 1, ~x, ~y ∈ [0, B]d, (P, [~c1]1, [C2]1, [~c3]1) ←R Enc(mpk,P, ~x),
and (att, ~y, [~k1]2, [K2]2) ←R KeyGen(msk, att, ~y). The values computed by the decryption algorithm are such that
[~d>1 ]T := [(~c
>
1 W1
~k1| . . . |~c>1 Wn~k1)C]T ∈ G
1×|ct|
T , where C := EncCt(P) ∈ Z
n×|ct|




~k1| . . . |~c>1 Wn~k1)K]T ∈ G
1×|sk|
T , where K := EncKey(att) ∈ Z
(n+1)×|sk|
p . Thus, by correctness of the predi-









, γ = (~d>1 |~d>2 )~d = (~c>1 U~y|~c>1 W1~k1|






~d = (~c>1 U~y|~c>1 W1~k1| . . . |~c>1 Wn~k1) ·(1|0| . . . |0])> = ~c>1 U~y. Therefore, [out]T = [~x>~y]T .
Finally, assuming the valueB2d is polynomial in the security parameter, the decryption can efficiently recover the dis-
crete logarithm out from [out]T .
Setup(1λ,Fipfe(d,B),P):
PG = (G1,G2,GT , p, P1, P2, e) ← PGGen(1λ), ~a,~b ←R DDH, U ←R Z2×dp , (n, |ct|, |sk|) ← Param(P), for all i ∈ [n],
Wi ←R Z2×2p , mpk :=
(
[~a]1, [~b]2, [U
>~a]1, {[W>i ~a]1, [Wi~b]2}i∈[n]
)
, msk := U. Return (mpk,msk).
Enc(mpk,P, ~x):
s ←R Zp, [~c1]1 := [~as]1, C := EncCt(P) ∈ Zn×|ct|p , [C2]1 := [(W>1 ~c1| . . . |W>n~c1)C]1, [~c3]1 := [~x + U>~c1]1. Return




r ←R Zp, [~k1]2 := [~br]2, K := EncKey(att) ∈ Z(n+1)×|sk|p , [K2]2 := [(U~y|W1~k1| . . . |Wn~k1)K]2, Return
(att, ~y, [~k1]2, [K2]2) ∈ U × [0, B]d ×G2 ×G2×|sk|2
Dec
(









2 ]T := e([~c1]
>
1 , [K2]2) ∈ G
1×|sk|
T , ~d := Decode(P, att), [γ]T := [(~d
>
1 |~d>2 )~d]T ∈ GT ,
[out]T := e([~c3]
>
1 , [~y]2)− [γ]T . Return out.
Fig. 1. A selectively-secure FE from pairings, for the function family Fipfe(d,B),P .
Theorem 3.2 (SEL-SIM security). If the underlying predicate encoding is secure, then the FE scheme from Fig. 1 is
SEL-SIM secure. Namely, for any PPT adversary A, there exist PPT adversaries B1 and B2 such that:
AdvSEL-INDFE,A (λ) ≤ Adv
DDH





where Q denotes the number of queries to OKeyGen.
Proof. The proof goes over a series of hybrid games, defined in Fig. 4. Let A be a PPT adversary. For any such
game G, we denote by AdvG(A) the probability Pr[1←R G(A)], that is, the probability that the game outputs 1 when
interacting with A. The probability is taken over the random coins of A and the game G itself. For an overview of the
ciphertext and key distributions in the proof, see Figs. 2 and 3.
Game G0: is the same as RealFEA (1λ) from Definition 2.6.
Game G1: in this game, the challenge ciphertext is switched to the semi-functional distribution (see Fig. 2). Namely,
the vector [~c1]1 contained in the challenge ciphertext is switched to uniformly random over G21, using the DDH
assumption. The game is described fully in Fig. 4 and is indistinguishable from G0 by Lemma 3.3.
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Ciphertext [~c1]1 [C2]1 [~c3]1 Hybrid
Normal [~as]1, s←R Zp [(W>1 ~c1| . . . |W>n~c1)C]1 [~x? +U>~c1]1 G0
SF [~c1]1 ←R G21 [(W>1 ~c1| . . . |W>n~c1)C]1 [~x? +U>~c1]1 G1
Simulated ~c1 ←R Z2p \ span(~a) [(W>1 ~c1| · · · |W>n~c1)C]1 [U>~c1]1 IdealFEA,S(1λ)
Fig. 2. Overview of ciphertext distributions appearing in the proof of Theorem 3.2, with changes between hybrids highlighted with
a gray background. SF stands for semi-functional. Here, C := EncCt(P?).
Type of j th Key Remark [~k1]2 [K2]2 Hybrid
Normal r ←R Zp [~br]2 [(U~y|W1~k1| · · · |Wn~k1)K]2 G0
Pseudo if P?(att) = 0 [~k1]2 ←R G21 [(U~y|W1~k1| · · · |Wn~k1)K]2 Hj−1.2
Pseudo SF if P?(att) = 0 [~k1]2 ←R G21 [(Ũ~y|W1~k1| · · · |Wn~k1)K]2 Hj−1.7
SF if P?(att) = 0 [~br]2 [(Ũ~y|W1~k1| · · · |Wn~k1)K]2 Hj+1
Simulated if P?(att)=0 [~br]2 [(Ũ~y|W1~k1| · · · |Wn~k1)K]2 IdealFEA,S(1λ)
Simulated if P?(att)=1 [~br]2 [(−~y>~x? · ~a⊥ +U~y|W1~k1| · · · |Wn~k1)K]2 IdealFEA,S(1λ)
Fig. 3. Overview of key distributions appearing in the proof of Theorem 3.2, with changes between hybrids highlighted with a gray
background. SF stands for semi-functional. Throughout the figure, K = EncKey(att).
Lemma 3.3. There exists a PPT adversary B1, such that:
|AdvG1(A)− AdvG0(A)| ≤ Adv
DDH
G1,B1(λ).
Proof. The PPT adversary B1 receives the DDH challenge ([~a]1, [~z]1) where ~a←R DDH, [~z]1 := [~as]1 with s←R Zp
or [~z]1 ←R G21, then samples Wi ←R Z2×2p , U ←R Z2×dp , ~b ←R DDH and simulates the experiment for A in the
following way:
Simulation of the master public key: Since B1 samples U and Wi himself, he can use the encoding [~a]1 to











Simulation of the encryption challenge: AdversaryB1 sets [~c1]1 := [~z]1, C := EncCt(P), [C2]1 := [(W>1 ~z| . . . |W>n ~z)C]1,
[~c3]1 := [~x
? +U>~z]1, and returns (P, [~c1]1, [C2]1, [~c3]1). When B1 gets a DDH challenge of the form [~z]1 := [~as]1
with s←R Zp, it simulates G1, whereas it simulates G2 when [~z]1 is uniformly random over G1.
Simulation of the functional keys: B1 generates the keys straightforwardly as described in G0, using the matrix
U, {Wi}i∈[n], and~b.
Game G2: in this game, all the functional decryption keys associated with an attribute att such that P?(att) = 0 are
switched to semi-functional (see Fig. 3). That is, for these keys, the matrix Ũ (defined in Fig. 4) is used in place
of the master secret key U. Note that the matrix Ũ, as opposed to the master secret key U, can be computed
(information theoretically) from mpk only. These semi-functional keys decrypt successfully normal ciphertexts
(which can be produced from mpk), but fail to decrypt semi-functional ciphertexts.
To switch keys from normal to semi-functional, we use a hybrid argument across keys, where each key is first
switched to a high entropy distribution, typically referred to as pseudo mode in the dual system methodology
[Wat09], where the vector [~k1]2 contained in the key is switched to uniformly random over G22, using the DDH
assumption. At this point, the proof relies on the security of the predicate encoding to switch the key a semi-
functional distribution. After this statistical transition, the vector [~k1]2 is switched back to its original distribution,
and the proof proceeds to the next key. Details of the transition from game G1 to game G2 are given in Lemma 3.4.
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G0, G1, G2 :
(P?, ~x?)← A(1λ)









∈ Zdp, Ũ := ~a~u>0 ∈ Z2×dp
ct? ← OEnc(P?, ~x?)
b← AOKeyGen(·)(mpk, ct?)
OEnc(P?, ~x?):
s←R Zp, [~c1]1 := [~as]1, [~c1]1 ←R G21 , C := EncCt(P?), [C2]1 := [(W>1 ~c1| . . . |W>n~c1)C]1, [~c3]1 := [~x? +U>~c1]1. Return
(P?, [~c1]1, [C2]1, [~c3]1)
OKeyGen(att, ~y):
r ←R Zp, [~k1]2 := [~br]2, K := EncKey(att), [K2]2 := [(U~y|W1~k1| · · · |Wn~k1)K]2,
If P?(att) = 0, then [K2]2 := [(Ũ~y|W1~k1| · · · |Wn~k1)K]2 . Return (att, ~y, [~k1]2, [K2]2)
Fig. 4. Hybrid games for the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Even though the hybrid argument used here is standard in the context of dual system encryption, the crucial
difference is that only the keys associated with att such that P?(att) = 0 can be switched to semi-functional. The
other keys should actually decrypt the challenge ciphertext properly. This is the reason the experiment needs to
know in advance the value P?, so as to determine which key can be switched. For the keys that cannot be switched,
we use a security argument similar to that used in [ALS16] instead.
Lemma 3.4 (From Game G1 to game G2). There exists a PPT adversary B2 such that:





where Q denotes the number of queries to OKeyGen.
Proof. The proof goes over a series of hybrid games, defined in Fig. 5. Let A be a PPT adversary. For any such
game H, we denote by AdvH(A) the probability Pr[1 ←R H(A)], that is, the probability that the experiment
outputs 1 when interacting with A.
Game Hj−1: this game is the same as G1, except that the first j − 1 queries to OKeyGen are answered as in G2.
Thus, the game H0 is the same as G1 and HQ is the same as G2, where Q denotes the number of queries to
OKeyGen. We show that for all j ∈ [1, Q], the games Hj−1 and Hj are computationally indistinguishable,
using the intermediate hybrid games Hj−1.1 and Hj−1.2, defined in Fig. 5.
Game Hj−1.1: this game is the same as Hj−1, except that the j-th functional decryption key is switched to a high
entropy distribution, where the vector [~k1]2 is switched to uniformly random over G22. This is referred to as the
pseudo distribution in Fig. 3. Recall that the key is associated to attributes att. The functional key is changed
only if P?(att) = 0, where P? is the predicate of the challenge ciphertext. If the j-th functional decryption
key is associated with an attribute att such that P?(att) = 1, then we make no changes and move on to Hj.1.
Let’s consider now the case P?(att) = 0. We build an adversary Bj.1 such that:
|AdvHj−1(A)− AdvHj−1.1(A)| ≤ Adv
DDH
G2,Bj.1(λ).
Upon receiving the DDH challenge ([~b]2, [~z]2) where~b←R DDH, [~z]2 := [~br]2 with r ←R Zp or [~z]2 ←R G22,
Bj.1 samples Wi ←R Z2×2p for all i ∈ [n], U ←R Z2×dp , upon which it can simulate the experiment for
A straightforwardly. When [~z]2 := [~br]2, Bj.1 simulates Hj−1, whereas it simulates Hj−1.1 when [~z]2 is
uniformly random over G22.
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Game Hj−1.2: In this game, we change the distribution of the vector [~k1] used in the j-th functional decryption
key from uniformly random over G22 to uniformly random over G22 \ span([~b]2). Since the size of span([~b]2) is
at most p, while the size of G22 is p2, this change only induces a statistical change of 1/p. Namely, we obtain:
|AdvHj−1.1(A)− AdvHj−1.2(A)| ≤ 1p .
Game Hj−1.3: Consider first orthogonal vectors ~a⊥,~b⊥, such that ~a⊥ ←R Z2p \ {0},~b⊥ ←R Z2p \ {0} with
~a>~a⊥ = 0 and ~b>~b⊥ = 0. In this game, we change for every i ∈ [n], the distribution of matrices Wi to
Wi + vi · ~a⊥(~b⊥)>, with vi ←R Zp. We use the fact that for all ~a⊥,~b⊥ ∈ Z2p, the following distributions are
identical:
{Wi}i∈[n] and {Wi + vi · ~a⊥(~b⊥)> }i∈[n],
where for all i ∈ [n], Wi ←R Z2×2p , vi ←R Zp. This is because each Wi is uniformly random over Z2×2p .
The leftmost distribution corresponds to Hj−1.2, whereas the rightmost distribution corresponds to Hj−1.3.





1 ~c1 + v1 ·~b⊥(~a⊥)>~c1 | · · · |W>n~c1 + vn ·~b⊥(~a⊥)>~c1 )C]1




· (v1| · · · |vn)C
]
1
where C := EncCt(P?).
For all keys of index i 6= j, the corresponding ~k1 is in the span of ~b (i.e. ~k1 ∈ span(~b)), thus, we have that
(~b⊥)>~k1 = 0, and the fine-dotted factors from the j-th key below vanish in all keys, except for the j-th one.
The j-th key is of the following form:
[K2]2 := [(U~y|W1~k1 + v1 · ~a⊥(~b⊥)>~k1 | · · · |Wn~k1 + vn · ~a⊥(~b⊥)>~k1 )K]2




(~0|v1| · · · |vn)K]2 ,
Finally, because of the orthogonality constraints imposed on ~a⊥ and ~b⊥, the extra terms (highlighted in fine-
dotted boxes) also do not appear in mpk. We thus have:
AdvHj−1.2(A) = AdvHj−1.3(A).
Game Hj−1.4: In this game, the value α used to generate the j-th functional decryption key (see Fig. 5) is
switched to uniformly random over Zp. Using the security of the underlying predicate encoding, we can
argue that the following are identically distributed:(




(v1| · · · |vn)C, (0|v1| · · · |vn)K
)
.
The leftmost value corresponds to Hj−1.3, whereas the rightmost value corresponds to Hj−1.4. Thus, we have:
AdvHj−1.3(A) = AdvHj−1.4(A).
Game Hj−1.5: In this game, the vector ~v used to generate the j-th functional decryption key (see Fig. 5) is
switched to Ũ~y instead of U~y. We show that Hj−1.4 and Hj−1.5 are identically distributed. Using the basis
(~a,~a⊥) of Z2p, we can write U = ~a~u>0 + ~a⊥~u>1 , where ~u0 = U
>~a
‖~a‖22
, and ~u1 ←R Z2p.
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Thus, we can write the j-th key as (att, ~y, [~k1]2, [K2]2), with [~k1]2 ←R G22 \ span([~b]2), and:
[K2]2 :=
[





(Ũ~y|W1~k1| · · · |Wn~k1)K
+ ~a⊥(~b⊥)>~k1(0|v1| · · · |vn)K+ ~a⊥
(
α · (~b⊥)>~k1 + ~u>1 ~y
∣∣∣0∣∣∣ · · · ∣∣∣0)K]
2
,
where K := EncKey(att).
We conclude using the fact that for all vectors ~a⊥,~b⊥,~k1 ∈ Z2p such that ~k>1 ~b⊥ 6= 0, the following are
identically distributed:
~k>1
~b⊥ · α+ ~u>1 ~y and ~k>1 ~b⊥ · α,
where α ←R Zp. The leftmost distribution corresponds to Hj−1.4, whereas the rightmost distribution corre-
sponds to Hj−1.5. Thus, we have:
AdvHj−1.4(A) = AdvHj−1.5(A).
Game Hj−1.6: In this game, the value α used to generate the j-th functional decryption key (see Fig. 5) is
switched back to 0. This transition is the reverse than the transition from Hj−1.3 to Hj−1.4. Similarly, we
use the security of the underlying predicate encoding to argue that the following are identically distributed:(




(v1| · · · |vn)C, (0|v1| · · · |vn)K
)
.
The leftmost value corresponds to Hj−1.6, whereas the rightmost value corresponds to Hj−1.5. Thus, we have:
AdvHj−1.5(A) = AdvHj−1.6(A).
Game Hj−1.7: Switching back from Wi + vi · ~a⊥(~b⊥)> to Wi for all i ∈ [n], we can write the matrix [C2]1 in
the challenge ciphertext as:
[C2]1 = [(W
>
1 ~c1| · · · |W>n~c1)C]1
and the matrix [K2]2 in the j-th key as:
[K2]2 := [(Ũ~y|W1~k1| · · · |Wn~k1)K]2
Similarly to the transition between Hj−1.2 and Hj−1.3, it holds that:
AdvHj−1.6(A) = AdvHj−1.7(A).
Game Hj−1.8: we switch the distribution of the vector [~k1]2 contained in the j-th from uniform over G22 \
span([~b]2) back to uniform over G22. This is the reverse transition than from Hj−1.1 to Hj−1.2. We have:
|AdvHj−1.7(A)− AdvHj−1.8(A)| ≤ 1p .
Game Hj: we switch the distribution of the vector [~k1]2 contained in the j-th key back to [~k1]2 := [~br]2 for
r ←R Zp. This transition is similar to the transition between game Hj−1 and Hj−1.1. Thus, we obtain a PPT
adversary Bj.2 such that:
|AdvHj−1.8(A)− AdvHj (A)| ≤ Adv
DDH
G2,Bj.2(λ).
Summing up for all j ∈ [Q], we obtain the lemma.
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Hj , Hj.1 , Hj.2, Hj.3, Hj.4, Hj.5 , Hj.6 , Hj.7 , Hj.8 ,Hj.9 :
(P?, ~x?)←R A(1λ)
PG ←R PGGen(1λ), ~a,~b←R DDH, U←R Z2×dp , (n, |ct|, |sk|)←R Param(P), for all i ∈ [n], Wi ←R Z2×2p









∈ Zdp, Ũ := ~a~u>0 ∈ Z2×dp
ct? ←R OEnc(P?, ~x?)
b←R AOKeyGen(·)(mpk, ct?)
OEnc(P?, ~x?):
[~c1]1 ←R G21, C := EncCt(P), [C2]1 := [(W>1 ~c1| · · · |W>n~c1)C]1
[C2]1 = [(W
>









1 ~c1| · · · |W>n~c1)C]1
[~c3]1 := [~x
? +U>~c1]1.
Return (P?, [~c1]1, [C2]1, [~c3]1)
OKeyGen(att, ~y):
On the the ρ-th query:
r ←R Zp, [~k1]2 := [~br]1, K := EncKey(att).
If ρ = j + 1 and P?(att) = 0, then [~k1]2 ←R G22.
If ρ = j + 1 and P?(att) = 0, then [~k1]2 ←R G22 \ span([~b]2) .
If ρ ≤ j and P?(att) = 0, then: [K2]2 := [(Ũ~y|W1~k1| · · · |Wn~k1)K]2
If ρ > j or P?(att) = 1, then: [K2]2 := [(U~y|W1~k1| · · · |Wn~k1)K]2
If ρ = j + 1 and P?(att) = 0, then:
~u = U~y, α = 0, α←R Zp , ~u = Ũ~y ,
[K2]2 := [~u|W1~k1| · · · |Wn~k1)K+ (~a⊥(~b⊥)>~k1)(α|v1| . . . |vn)K]2
if ρ = j + 1 and P?(att) = 0, then:[K2]2 := [(Ũ~y|W1~k1| · · · |Wn~k1)K]2
Return (att, ~y, [~k1]2, [K2]2)
Fig. 5. Hybrid games for the proof of Lemma 3.4, where Hj is defined for all j ∈ [Q], and Hj.i are defined for all j ∈ [Q − 1],
i ∈ {1 . . . 9}. The six type of boxes denote which figure components belong to the hybrid.
Game IdealFEA,S(1λ): we show this game is statistically close to G2. The simulator S := (S̃etup, Ẽnc, K̃eyGen) is
described in Fig. 6. First, we use the fact that for all ~a ∈ Z2p, the following distributions are within 1/p statistical
distance:
~c1 ←R Z2p and ~c1 ←R Z2p \ span(~a).
The leftmost distribution corresponds to G2, whereas the rightmost distribution corresponds to IdealFEA,S(1
λ).
Then, we use the fact that for all ~x? ∈ Zd, the following distributions are identical:
(~a,~c1, Ũ,U) and (~a,~c1, Ũ,U− ~a⊥(~x?)>),
where ~a←R DDH, ~c1 ←R Z2p \ span(~a), U←R Z2×dp , ~u0 := U
>~a
‖~a‖22
, Ũ := ~a~u>0 , and ~a
⊥ ∈ Z2p such that ~a>~a⊥ = 0
and ~c>1 ~a
⊥ = 1. This is because U is a uniformly random matrix, so adding an offset −~a⊥(~x?)> does not change
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its distribution. This extra offset doesn’t appear in Ũ since ~a>~a⊥ = 0. The leftmost distribution corresponds to
G2, whereas the rightmost distribution corresponds to IdealFEA,S(1
λ).




λ)]| ≤ 1p .
S̃etup(1λ,Fipfe(d,B),P):
PG ← GGen(1λ), ~a,~b ←R DDH, ~c1 ←R Z2p \ span(~a), ~a⊥ ←R Z2p such that ~c>1 ~a⊥ = 1 and ~a>~a⊥ = 0,
U←R Z2×dp , ~u0 := U
>~a
‖~a‖22











C := EncCt(P), [C2]1 := [(W>1 ~c1| · · · |W>n~c1)C]1, [~c3]1 := [U>~c1]1. Return (P?, [~c1]1, [C2]1, [~c3]1)
K̃eyGen(m̃sk,P?, ~y, att,P?(att) · ~y>~x?):
r ←R Zp, [~k1]2 := [~br]2, K := EncKey(att).
If P?(att) = 0, then [K2]2 := [(Ũ~y|W1~k1| · · · |Wn~k1)K]2.
If P?(att) = 1, then [K2]2 := [(−~y>~x? · ~a⊥ +U~y|W1~k1| · · · |Wn~k1)K]2.
Return (att, ~y, [~k1]2, [K2]2)
Fig. 6. PPT simulator for the security proof of the FE scheme from Fig. 4.
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3.2 FE with adaptive, indistinguishability based security
In this section, we build FE schemes for the family of functionsFipfe(d,B),P , whereP corresponds to identity-based en-
cryption, inner-product predicate encryption, or even monotone span programs. Similarly to the selective construction
in Section 3.1, we give a modular construction that builds upon a simple, information-theoretic, one-time secure ob-
ject, that generalizes the notion of predicate encoding to functions, hence called function encoding. Namely, a function
encoding is a private-key version of functional encryption that only satisfies a one-time security notion.
Recall that our construction from Section 3.1 fails to achieve adaptive security, even if the underlying building
blocks are adaptively secure. The reason is that, throughout the security proof, only the functional decryption keys
associated with a pair (att, ~y) such that P?(att) = 0 can be turned to semi-functional, where P? is the predicate
chosen by the adversary for the challenge ciphertext. In fact, the other keys cannot be turned semi-functional, since
they must decrypt correctly the challenge ciphertext, and not just ciphertexts that can be generated from the public
key. This challenge does not arise in the typical dual system encryption methodology used for ABE, since none of the
queried keys can decrypt.
A similar situation arose in the context of fully-hiding predicate encryption for inner products, where ciphertexts
are associated with a vector ~̃x ∈ Znp , functional decryption keys are associated with ~̃y ∈ Znp , and decryption suc-
cessfully recovers the plaintext if ~̃x
>
~̃y = 0, whereas no information about that plaintext is revealed otherwise. As
opposed to regular inner-product encryption, the vector ~̃x is also hidden, the only bit of information that leaks is
whether ~̃x
>
~̃y = 0 or not. In this context, the adversary can query functional decryption keys that decrypt the challenge
ciphertext. This is still a meaningful security notion since ~̃x remains hidden even when such keys are queried.
We show that the techniques introduced by [OT12], later improved in [CGW18] for adaptively secure fully-hiding
predicate encryption for inner products are also relevant to obtain adaptively secure inner-product FE with fine-grained
access control (even when the predicate is not hidden). In fact, using function encodings, a new notion we introduce
that subsumes the notion of predicate encoding introduced in [Att14,Wee14] in the context of adaptively-secure ABE,
we generalize the approach of [OT12,CGW18] to a large class of functional encryption schemes, whereas their scheme
corresponds to the special case of inner-product encryption. Namely, we compile any function encoding for the func-
tion family F into an adaptively secure FE for the same class of functions from the SXDH assumption in asymmetric
pairings. In Appendix C, we give concrete function encodings that correspond to identity-based encryption, inner-
product predicate encryption, fully-hiding inner-product predicate encryption and monotone span programs.
Definition 3.5 (function encoding). Let F be a family of functions where each function f ∈ F is of the form
f : X → Zp, and p be a prime. A function encoding for (F ,Zp) is given by the following polynomial-time deterministic
algorithms:
– Param(F): takes as input the family of functions F , and returns the parameters (n, |ct|, |sk|) ∈ N3.
– EncCt(x): takes as input x ∈ X , and returns a matrix C ∈ Z(n+1)×|ct|p .
– EncKey(f): takes as input a function f ∈ F , and returns a matrix K ∈ Z(n+1)×|sk|p .
– Decode(f, part(x)): takes as input the partial information part(x) of x ∈ X and f ∈ F . It returns a vector
~d ∈ Z|ct|+|sk|p . (See Section 2.2 for a discussion on the partial information).
We require the following properties.
Correctness. For all x ∈ X and f ∈ F , C := EncCt(x) ∈ Z(n+1)×|ct|p , K := EncKey(f) ∈ Z(n+1)×|sk|p , ~d :=
Decode(f, part(x)), we have: (C|K)~d = (f(x), 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Zn+1p .
Security. For any x0, x1 ∈ X and f ∈ F such that f(x0) = f(x1) and part(x0) = part(x1), the following are
identically distributed:
~v>(C|K) with C := EncCt(x0),K := EncKey(f)
and
~v>(C|K) with C := EncCt(x1),K := EncKey(f),
where ~v ←R Zn+1p .
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Example: Identity-Based Encryption. Each function is described by an identity id ∈ Zp and a vector ~y ∈ [0, B]d,
takes as input another identity id′ ∈ Zp and a vector ~x ∈ [0, B]d, and outputs ~x>~y if id = id′, 0 otherwise. The partial
information part(~x, id) = id.
– Param: returns the parameters (2d, |ct| = d, |sk| = n+ 1).
– EncCt(~x, id): given ~x ∈ Znp and id ∈ Zp, returns a matrix C ∈ Z
(2d+1)×d
p such that C>(w0, ~w1, ~w2) = (w0~x +
~w1 + id~w2) ∈ Zdp.
– EncKey(~y, id′): given ~y ∈ Znp and id
′ ∈ Zp, returns a matrix K ∈ Z(2d+1)×1p such that K>(w0, ~w1, ~w2) =
~y>(~w1 + id
′ ~w2) ∈ Zp.
– Decode(id, id′, ~y): if ~x>~y = 0, it returns the vector ~d := (~y,−1) ∈ Zd+1p .
Our modular construction is presented in Fig. 7. Proofs of correctness and security are given below.
Setup(1λ,Fipfe(d,B),P):
PG = (G1,G2,GT , p, P1, P2, e)← PGGen(1λ), ~a←R DDH,~b←R Z3p, (n, |ct|, |sk|)← Param(Fipfe(d,B),P), for all i ∈ [0, n],










s ←R Zp, [~c1]1 := [~as]1 ∈ G21, C := EncCt(P, ~x) ∈ Z
(n+1)×|ct|
p , [C2]1 := [(W>0 ~c1| . . . |W>n~c1)C]1 ∈ G
3×|ct|
1 . Return
(part(P, ~x), [~c1]1, [C2]1).
KeyGen(msk, att, ~y):
r ←R Zp, [~k1]2 := [~br]2 ∈ G32, K := EncKey(att, ~y) ∈ Z
(n+1)×|sk|
p , [K2]2 := [(W0~k1| . . . |Wn~k1)K]2 ∈ G2×|sk|2 ,
[~k3]2 := [W0~k1]2 ∈ G22. Return (att, ~y, [~k1]2, [K2]2, [~k3]2).
Dec
(
part(P, ~x), [~c1]1, [C2]1, ~y, [~k1]2, [K2]2, [~k3]2):
[~d1]T := e([C2]
>




2 ]T := e([~c1]
>
1 , [K2]2) ∈ G
1×|sk|
T , ~d := Decode(part(P, ~x), att), [γ]T := [(~d1, ~d2)
> ~d]T ∈
GT , Return out ∈ [0, dB2] such that [γ]T = [~c>1 ~k3 · out]T . If there isn’t such out, return ⊥.
Fig. 7. An adaptively-secure FE from pairings, for the function family Fipfe(d,B),P .
Correctness. Observe that for all predicates P ∈ P and vectors ~x ∈ [0, B]d, the vector [(W>0 ~c1|W>1 ~c1| . . . |
W>n~c1)]1 ∈ G3×n1 can be computed from mpk and the randomness s ←R Zp used by the encryption algorithm to
compute [~c1]1 := [~as]1. Then, the encryption algorithm multiplies by the matrix C := EncCt(P, ~x) ∈ Z(n+1)×|ct|p
to obtain [C2]1 ∈ G3×|ct|1 . Similarly, for all attributes att ∈ U , the vector [(W0~k1|W1~k1| . . . |Wn~k1)]2 ∈ G
2×n
2
can be computed from mpk, msk, and the randomness r ←R Zp used by the key generation algorithm to compute
[~k1]2 := [~br]2. Then, the key generation algorithm multiplies by the matrix K := EncKey(att, ~y) ∈ Z(n+1)×|sk|p to
obtain [K2]1 ∈ G2×|sk|2 .
Let P ∈ P and att ∈ U such that P(att) = 1, ~x, ~y ∈ [0, B]d, (part(P, ~x), [~c1]1, [C2]1) ←R Enc(mpk,P, ~x),













, which implies that [~d>1 ]T = [(~c
>
1 W0
~k1|~c>1 W1~k1| . . . |~c>1 Wn~k1)C]T ∈ G
1×|ct|
T ,
where C := EncCt(P, ~x) ∈ Z(n+1)×|ct|p , and the second equality holds because ~c>1Wi~k1 ∈ Zp, for every i ∈ {0 . . . n}.
Also, [~d>2 ]T := [(~c
>
1 W0
~k1|~c>1 W1~k1| . . . |~c>1 Wn~k1)K]T ∈ G
1×|sk|




Thus, by correctness of the function encoding (Param,EncCt,EncKey,Decode), we have [γ]T := [~c>1 W0~k1·~x>~y]T =
[~c>1
~k3 · ~x>~y] ∈ GT . Therefore, assuming the value B2d is polynomial in the security parameter, the decryption can
efficiently recover out = ~x>~y ∈ [0, B2d].
G0, G1, G2 :
β ←R {0, 1},PG ← PGGen(1λ),~a←R DDH,~b←R Z3p, (n, |ct|, |sk|)← Param(Fipfe(d,B),P), for all i ∈ [0, n], Wi ←R Z2×3p ,
mpk :=
(
[~a]1, {[W>i ~a]1, }i∈[n]
)(





(P0, ~x0), (P1, ~x1)
)
β′ ← AOKeyGen(·)(mpk, ct?)
Return 1 if β′ = β, 0 otherwise.
OEnc
(
(P0, ~x0), (P1, ~x1)
)
:
s ←R Zp, [~c1]1 := [~as]1, [~c1]1 ←R G21 C := EncCt(Pβ , ~xβ), C := EncCt(P0, ~x0) , [C2]1 :=
[(W>0 ~c1|W>1 ~c1| . . . |W>n~c1)C]T , Return ct? := (part(Pβ , ~xβ), [~c1]1, [C2]1)
OKeyGen(att, ~y):
r ←R Zp, [~k1]2 := [~br]1, K := EncKey(att, ~y), [K2]2 := [(W0~k1|W1~k1| · · · |W~k1)K]2, [~k3]2 := [W0~k1]2. Return
(att, ~y, [~k1]2, [K2]2, [~k3]2)
Fig. 8. Hybrid games for the proof of Theorem 3.6.
Theorem 3.6 (AD-IND security). If the underlying function encoding is secure, then the FE scheme from Fig. 7 is
AD-IND secure. Namely, for any PPT adversary A, there exist PPT adversaries B1 and B2 such that:





where Q denotes the number of queries to OKeyGen.
Proof. The proof uses a series of hybrid games, described in Fig. 8. For each game G, we define by AdvG(A) the
advantage of A in G, that is: 2 · |Pr[1←R G(A)]− 1/2|.
Game G0: is defined such that AdvG0(A) = Adv
AD-IND
FE,A (λ).
Game G1: here we change the distribution of the vector [~c1]1 that is part of the challenge ciphertext to uniformly
random over G21, using the DDH assumption in G1. Namely, we build a PPT adversary B1 such that:
|AdvG0(A)− AdvG1(A)| ≤ Adv
DDH
G1,B1(λ).
Upon receiving a challenge (PG, [~a]1, [~z]1), where [~z]1 := [~as]1 for s ←R Zp, or [~z]1 ←R G21, the adversary
B1 samples (n, |ct|, |sk|) ← Param(Fipfe(d,B),P), for all i ∈ [0, n], Wi ←R Z2×3p , and simulate A’s view in a
straightforward way, setting [~c1]1 := [~z]1 in the challenge ciphertext.
Game G2: here we change the distribution of the challenge ciphertext so that it doesn’t depend on the random bit
β ←R {0, 1} anymore. Clearly,
AdvG2(A) = 0.
We show that G1 and G2 are computationally indistinguishable using the security of a private-key variant of our
scheme. Namely, we exhibit a PPT adversary B2 such that:
|AdvG1(A)−AdvG2(A)| ≤ AdvH0(B2),
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where AdvH0(B2) denotes the advantage of B2 in game H0, which is the private-key analogue of game G0 (see
Fig. 10). We use the fact that for any i ∈ [0, n]: (W>i ~a,W>i ~c1) with Wi ←R Z2×3p , ~a ←R DDH, ~c1 ←R
Z3p, is within negligible statistical distance from (W>i ~a, ~wi) with ~wi ←R Z3p. Roughly speaking, the vectors ~wi
can be used as a fresh private-key, independent of the public key {[W>i ~a]1}. Note that when ~a ←R DDH and
~a⊥ ←R Z2p \ {0} such that ~a>~a⊥ = 0, we have that the vectors (~a|~a⊥) form a basis of Z2p. Thus we can write
W>i := ~̃wi~a
> + ~wi(~a
⊥)>, where ~̃wi, ~wi ←R Z3p, and ~a⊥ ∈ Z2p is such that ~a>~a⊥ = 0 and ~c>1 ~a⊥ = 1. This way,






the challenge ciphertext can be written as:
(part(Pβ , ~xβ), [~c1]1, [C2]1), with [~c1]1 ←R G21,
C := EncCt(Pβ , ~xβ),
[C2]1 := [(~w
>
0 |~w>1 | . . . |~w>n )C]1,
which corresponds exactly to game H0. The functional decryption keys can be written as:
r ←R Zp, [~k1]2 := [~br]1,K := EncKey(att, ~y),
[K2]2 := [(~a ~̃w0
>
+ ~a⊥ ~w>0 )
~k1| · · · |(~a ~̃wn
>
+ ~a⊥ ~w>n )
~k1)K]2,
[~k3]2 := [(~a ~̃w0
>
+ ~a⊥ ~w>0 )
~k1]2.
The adversary B2 samples ~̃wi ←R Z3p for all i ∈ [0, n] and ~a ←R DDH, ~a⊥ ←R Z2p such that ~a>~a⊥ = 0,
thanks to which it can simulate the public key to A. To generate the challenge ciphertext, B2 forwards the
query
(
(P0, ~x0), (P1, ~x1)
)
to its own encryption oracle, and forwards its challenge ciphertext to A. When A
queries OKeyGen(att, ~y), B2 queries its own oracle to get skatt,~y := (att, ~y, [~k1]2, [~k2]2, [k3]2), where [~k>2 ]2 :=
[(~w>0
~k1| . . . |~w>n ~k1)K]2 for K := EncKey(att, ~y), and [k3]2 := [~w>0 ~k1]2. B2 computes [K′2]2 := [~a⊥~k>2 ]2 +
[~a( ~̃w0
>
| . . . | ~̃wn
>
)K]2, and [~k′3]2 := [~a
⊥k3]2 + [~a ~̃w0
>
~k1]2, and returns ([~k1]2, [K′2]2, [~k
′
3]2) to A.
In Lemma 3.7, we show that AdvH0(B2) is negligible.
Lemma 3.7. For any PPT adversary A, there exists a PPT adversary B such that:
AdvH0(A) ≤ 4Q · Adv
DDH
G2,B(λ),
where Q denotes the number of queries to OKeyGen.
Proof. The proof uses a series of hybrid games, described in Figs. 9 and 10. For any game H, we denote by
AdvH(A) the advantage of A in H, that is, the probability Pr[1 ←R H(A)] that the game H returns 1 when
interacting with A, where the probability is taken over the random coins of A and the game H itself.








i ←R Zp, for all i ∈ [0, n]. This basis is dual to the random basis (~b|~b2|~b3), that is:
~b>2
~b∗ = ~b>3













Game H1: we change the component of the ciphertext along the vector ~b∗3, using the one-time security of the
function encoding. Namely, we use the fact that (w30| . . . |w3n)Cβ is identically distributed to (w30| . . . |w3n)C0,
where w30, . . . , w
3
n ←R Zp, Cβ := EncCt(Pβ , ~xβ), and C0 := EncCt(P0, ~x0), by security of the function
encoding (see Definition 3.5). Note that we rely on the fact that the values (w30| . . . |w3n) do not appear in the
functional decryption keys, since all of these keys contain vectors [~k1]2 such that ~k>1 ~b
∗
3 = 0.
Game H1.q: is defined in Fig. 9 for all q ∈ [Q] where Q denotes the number of queries to OKeyGen. Note that
H1.0 is the same as game H1. To show that H1.q−1 is computationally indistinguishable from H1.q for all
q ∈ [Q], we use intermediate hybrid games H1.q−1.1,H1.q−1.2, and H1.q−1.3, also defined in Fig. 9.
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Game H1.q−1.1: in this game, we switch the distribution of the output to the q-th query to OKeyGen. Namely, the
vector [~k1]2 is sampled uniformly in span([~b2]2) instead of span([~b]2). This is done using the DDH assumption
in G2. The reduction from DDH must not know the vectors ~b∗ and ~b∗2, which are trapdoors for the DDH
assumption (they permit to test membership in span([~b]2) or span([~b2]2) respectively). Indeed, it is possible to






i ←R Zp for all i ∈ [0, n], without knowing explicitly the vectors
~b∗ and ~b∗2. We consider an intermediate game H
′
1.q−1.1 which is like H1.q−1.1 except that the vector [~k1]2
from the q-th key is sampled uniformly over span([~b]2, [~b2]2). We build PPT adversaries B′1.q−1 and B′1.q−1.1
such that: |AdvH1.q−1(A)− AdvH′1.q−1.1(A)| ≤ Adv
As−1
PG,B′1.q−1
(λ), and |AdvH′1.q−1.1(A)− AdvH1.q−1.1(A)| ≤
AdvAs−2PG,B′1.q−1.1
(λ). By Lemma 3.8, this implies the existence of a PPT adversary B1.q−1 such that
|AdvH1.q−1(A)− AdvH1.q−1.1(A)| ≤ 2 · Adv
DDH
G2,B1.q−1(λ).













0| . . . |~u>1 w1n + ~u>2 w2n)Cβ and ~c0>2 := (~b∗>3 w30| . . . |~b∗>3 w3n)C0 with w1i , w2i , w3i ←R Zp for all
i ∈ [0, n], Cβ := EncCt(Pβ , ~xβ) and C0 := EncCt(P0, ~x0). It computes the keys as follows. For the q−1 first
keys, it samples [~k1]2 ←R span([~b3]2); for the q-th key, it uses [~k1]2 := [~z]2, and for the last Q− q− 1 keys it









i for all i ∈ [0, n]. The adversary B′1.q−1.1 works similarly.
Game H1.q−1.2: Here we switch the distribution of the challenge ciphertext, using the fact that the following
distributions are identical:
(w20| . . . |w20)>Cβ , (w20| . . . |w20)>K and (w20| . . . |w20)>C0, (w20| . . . |w20)>K,
where w20, . . . , w
2
n ←R Zp, Cβ := EncCt(Pβ , ~xβ), C0 := EncCt(P0, ~x0), and K := EncKey(att, ~y). This
holds by security of the function encoding (see Definition 3.5), since by definition of the security game,
we have P0(att) · ~y>~x0 = P1(att) · ~y>~x1 for all queries (att, ~y) to OKeyGen. The leftmost distribution
corresponds to game H1.q−1.1, whereas the rightmost distribution corresponds to the game H1.q−1.2. Thus, we
have:
AdvH1.q−1.1(A) = AdvH1.q−1.2(A).
Game H1.q−1.3: in this game, we switch the distribution of the output to the q-th query to OKeyGen. Namely,
the vector [~k1]2 is sampled uniformly in span([~b3]2) instead of span([~b2]2). This is done using the DDH
assumption in G2. As for the transition between games H1.q−1.1 and H1.q−1.2, we consider an intermedi-
ate game H′1.q−1.2 which is like H1.q−1.2 except the vector [~k1]2 from the q-th key is sampled uniformly over
span([~b2]2, [~b3]2). We build PPT adversariesB′1.q−1.2 andB′1.q−1.3 such that: |AdvH1.q−1.2(A)−AdvH′1.q−1.2(A)| ≤
AdvAs−3PG,B′1.q−1.2
(λ), and |AdvH′1.q−1.2(A)−AdvH1.q−1.3(A)| ≤ Adv
As−4
PG,B′1.q−1.3
(λ). By Lemma 3.8, this implies
the existence of a PPT adversary B1.q−1.2 such that
|AdvH1.q−1.2(A)− AdvH1.q−1.3(A)| ≤ 2 · Adv
DDH
G2,B1.q−1.2(λ).







(~b∗>w10| . . . |~b∗>w1n)Cβ and ~c0>2 := (~u>1 w20 + ~u>2 w30| . . . |~u>1 w2n + ~u>2 w3n)C0 with w1i , w2i , w3i ←R Zp for all
i ∈ [0, n]. It computes the keys as follows. For the q−1 first keys, it samples [~k1]2 ←R span([~b3]2); for the q-th
key, it uses [~k1]2 := [~z]2, and for the last Q− q−1 keys it computes [~k1]2 ←R span([~b]2). The rest of the keys
are computed as [~k>2 ]2 := [(~w
>
0
~k1|~w>1 ~k1| · · · |~w>n ~k1)K]T , [k3]2 := [~w>0 ~k1]2, with ~wi := ~b∗w1i +~u1w2i +~u2w3i
for all i ∈ [0, n]. The adversary B′1.q−1.3 works similarly.
Game H1.q: the transition between games H1.q−1.3 and H1.q is similar to the transition between games H0 and H1.
Namely,we switch the distribution of the challenge ciphertext, using the fact that the following distributions
are identical:
(w20| . . . |w20)>Cβ and (w20| . . . |w20)>C0,
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where w20, . . . , w
2
n ←R Zp, Cβ := EncCt(Pβ , ~xβ), and C0 := EncCt(P0, ~x0). The leftmost distribution
corresponds to game H1.q , whereas the rightmost distribution corresponds to the game H1.q−1.3. Thus, we
have:
AdvH1.q−1.3(A) = AdvH1.q (A).
Game H2: the transition between games H1.Q and H2 is also similar to the transition between games H0 and H1.
Namely, we switch the distribution of the challenge ciphertext, using the fact that the following distributions
are identical:
(w10| . . . |w10)>Cβ and (w10| . . . |w10)>C0,
where w10, . . . , w
1
n ←R Zp, Cβ := EncCt(Pβ , ~xβ), and C0 := EncCt(P0, ~x0). The leftmost distribution
corresponds to game H1.Q, whereas the rightmost distribution corresponds to the game H2. Thus, we have:
AdvH1.Q(A) = AdvH2(A).
H1.q , H1.q.1,H1.q.2, H1.q.3, H2:
β ←R {0, 1}, PG ← PGGen(1λ), (n, |ct|, |sk|) ← Param(F), let (~b|~b2|~b3) and (~b∗|~b∗2|~b∗3) be two random dual basis of Z3p. For
all i ∈ [0, n], j ∈ [3], ~wi ←R Z3p. We write ~wi := w1i~b∗ + w2i~b∗1 + w3i~b∗3(





(P0, ~x0), (P1, ~x1)
)
β′ ← AOKeyGen(·)(ct?)
Return 1 if β′ = β, 0 otherwise.
OEnc
(
(P0, ~x0), (P1, ~x1)
)
: H1.q , H1.q.1, H1.q.2, H1.q.3 , H2






0| . . . |~b∗>w1n +~b∗>2 w2n)Cβ
~cβ>2 := (
















0| . . . |~b∗>2 w2n +~b∗>3 w3n)C0
~c0>2 := (~w
>






Return ct? := (part(Pβ , ~xβ),~c2)
OKeyGen(att, ~y): H1.q , H1.q.1,H1.q.2 , H1.q.3 , H2
On the ρ-th query if ρ ≤ q, then ~k1 ←R span(~b3). If ρ > q, then ~k1 ←R span(~b).
If ρ = q + 1, then ~k1 ←R span(~b2). If ρ = q + 1, then ~k1 ←R span(~b3).
For all ρ, ~k1 ←R span(~b3)
K := EncKey(att, ~y), [~k>2 ]2 := [(~w>0 ~k1|~w>1 ~k1| · · · |~w>n ~k1)K]T , [k3]2 := [~w>0 ~k1]2.
Return (att, ~y, [~k1]2, [~k>2 ]2, [k3]2)
Fig. 9. Hybrid games for the proof of Lemma 3.7, where q ∈ [Q], and Q denotes the number of queries to OKeyGen.
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Assumptions. All assumptions are relative to a pairing group PG = (G1,G2,GT , p, P1, P2, e) ← PGGen(1λ)
and two random dual basis (~b|~b2|~b3) and (~b∗|~b∗2|~b∗3), that is, the vectors are sampled randomly subject to: ~b>2 ~b∗ =
~b>3
~b∗ = 0, ~b>~b∗ = 1, ~b>~b∗2 = ~b
>
3
~b∗2 = 0, ~b
>
2
~b∗2 = 1, ~b
>~b∗3 =
~b>2
~b∗3 = 0, ~b
>
3
~b∗3 = 1. For any assumption i and PPT
adversary A, we define the advantage AdvAs−iPG,A(λ) accordingly.
Assumption 1:
(
~u1, ~u2 ←R span(~b∗,~b∗2),~b∗3, [~b]2, [~b3]2, [~z]2 ←R span([~b]2)
)
≈c(





~u1, ~u2 ←R span(~b∗,~b∗2),~b∗3, [~b]2, [~b3]2, [~z]2 ←R span([~b2]2)
)
≈c(





~b∗, ~u1, ~u2 ←R span(~b∗2,~b∗3), [~b]2, [~b3]2, [~z]2 ←R span([~b2]2)
)
≈c(





~b∗, ~u1, ~u2 ←R span(~b∗2,~b∗3), [~b]2, [~b3]2, [~z]2 ←R span([~b3]2)
)
≈c(
~u1, ~u2 ←R span(~b∗,~b∗2),~b∗3, [~b]2, [~b3]2, [~z]2 ←R span([~b2]2, [~b3]2)
)
.
Lemma 3.8 (Reduction from DDH to the assumptions [OT09, Lew12]). For all the above assumptions, there
is a reduction from DDH in G2.
Proof. LetA be a PPT adversary. For each assumption i, we build a PPT adversary Bi that has a greater advantage
in breaking DDH in G2 that the advantage of A in breaking Assumption i. Upon receiving (PG, [~a]2, [~t]2), where
PG ←R PGGen(1λ), ~a←R DDH, [~t]2 := [~as]2 with s←R Zp, or [~t]2 ←R G22, adversary Bi does the following:



























































)>~b∗ = 0, which can be done efficiently,






, sample ~b,~b3 ←R Z3p such that ~b>3 ~b∗3 = 0 and ~b>~b∗ = 1, and
return
(
~b∗, ~u1, ~u2, [~b]2, [~b3]2, [~z]2
)
to A.




)>~b∗ = 0 and (~zz̃)>~b∗ = 0, re-












, sample~b←R Z3p such that~b>~b∗ = 1, and return
(





β ←R {0, 1}, PG ← PGGen(1λ), (n, |ct|, |sk|) ← Param(Fipfe(d,B),P), let (~b|~b2|~b3) and (~b∗|~b∗2|~b∗3) be two random dual basis
of Z3p. For all i ∈ [0, n], ~wi ←R Z3p. We write ~wi := w1i~b∗ + w2i~b∗1 + w3i~b∗3, with w1i , w2i , w3i ←R Zp(





(P0, ~x0), (P1, ~x1)
)
β′ ← AOKeyGen(·)(ct?)
Return 1 if β′ = β, 0 otherwise.
OEnc
(
(P0, ~x0), (P1, ~x1)
)
:
Cβ := EncCt(Pβ , ~xβ), C0 := EncCt(P0, ~x0),
~cβ>2 := (~w
>
0 | . . . |~w>n )Cβ , ~cβ>2 := (~b∗>w10 +~b∗>2 w20| . . . |~b∗>w1n +~b∗>2 w2n)Cβ ,
~c0>2 := 0






Return ct? := (part(Pβ , ~xβ),~c2)
OKeyGen(att, ~y):
~k1 ←R span(~b), K := EncKey(att, ~y), [~k>2 ]2 := [(~w>0 ~k1|~w>1 ~k1| · · · |~w>n ~k1)K]2, [k3]2 := [~w>0 ~k1]2. Return
(att, ~y, [~k1]2, [~k2]2, [k3]2)
Fig. 10. Hybrid games for the proofs of Theorem 3.6 and Lemma 3.7.
4 A Lattice-Based Identity-Based Functional Encryption in the Random-Oracle Model
In this section, we build an identity-based functional encryption (IFE) for the inner-product functionality from LWE in
the random-oracle model. In Section 5, we provide a lattice-based scheme that is proven secure in the standard model.
4.1 Lattice Preliminaries
Matrix norms For a vector ~u, ‖~u‖ denotes its `2 norm. For a matrix R, by R̃ we denote the result of applying Gram
Schmidt orthogonalization on the columns of R. In addition:
– ‖R‖ denotes the `2 norm of the longest column of R.
– ‖R‖2 denotes the operator norm of R, where ‖R‖2 = sup‖~x‖=1‖R~x‖, with ~x ∈ Zm
– s1(R) denotes the spectral norm (the largest singular value of R).
Known facts are that ‖R̃‖ ≤ ‖R‖ ≤ ‖R‖2 ≤
√
k‖R‖. We will also need the fact that concatenating two matrices
R,S yields s1(R|S) ≤
√
s1(R)2 + s1(S2). For bounding the spectral norm, we will require the following lemma:
Lemma 4.1. [DM14] Let X ∈ Rn×m be a subgaussian random matrix with parameter s. There exists a universal
constant C ≈ 1√
2π








Lattices. For any matrix A ∈ Zn×mq and any vector ~p ∈ Znq , we define the orthogonal q-ary lattice of A: Λ⊥q (A) :=
{~u ∈ Zm : A~u = ~0 mod q} and the shifted lattice: Λ~pq(A) := {~u ∈ Zm : A~u = ~p mod q}. Similarly, for any matrix
P ∈ Zn×`q , we define: ΛPq (A) := {U ∈ Zm×` : AU = P mod q}.
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Probability distributions Consider a lattice Λ ⊆ Zm. The normal Gaussian distribution of mean 0 and variance σ2 is






. The lattice gaussian distribution with support
Λ ⊆ Rn, standard deviation σ and centered at ~c is defined as:




Lemma 4.2 (Bounding Gaussian Noise). [MR04] For any n-dimensional lattice Λ, ~c ∈ span(Λ), real ε ∈ (0, 1),
and s ≥ ηε(Λ),
Pr
x←RDΛ,s,c





Also from [MR04, Lemma 3.2], for any n-dimensional lattice Λ, ηε(Λ) ≤
√
n/λ1(Λ
∗), where ε = 12n . This was im-
proved by [GPV08] to obtain that for any ω(
√
log n) function, there is a negligible ε(n) such that: ηε(Z) ≤ ω(
√
log n).





[|x− c| > s · t] ≤ negl(n).
Learning with errors (LWE) [Reg05] Let q be a prime, χ be a public distribution over Zq and ~s be uniformly random
over Znq . Moreover, ~s is constant across calls to oracles O~∫ or O$, defined below:
– Oracle O~s outputs samples (~a,~a>~s+ ~x), where ~a←R Znq and x←R χ are fresh and independently sampled.
– Oracle O$ outputs uniformly random elements of Znq × Zq .
Define another oracle O, which across all calls, is either O~s or O$. The learning with errors LWEq,χ,n problem is to
distinguish with non-negligible probability, given access to oracle O, whether it corresponds to O~s or O$.
Proposition 4.3 ([Reg05]). Let α = α(n) ∈ (0, 1) and let q = q(n) be a prime such that α · q > 2
√
n. If there exists
an efficient (possibly quantum) algorithm that solves LWEq,ψ̄α , then there exists an efficient quantum algorithm for
approximating SIVP and GapSVP in the `2 norm, in the worst case, to within Õ(n/α) factors.
In [Pei07], this result has been generalized for any `p norm, with 2 ≤ p ≤ ∞ and for similar Õ(n/α) approximation
factors.
Theorem 4.4. [GPV08, Theorem 4.1] There is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm SampleD that, given a basis
B of an n-dimensional lattice ∆ = L(B), a parameter s ≥ ‖B̃‖ · ω(
√
log n), and a center ~c ∈ R, outputs a sample
from a distribution that is statistically close to DΛ,s,~c.
Proposition 4.5. [Ajt99] For any prime q = poly(n) and any m ≥ 5n lg q, there is a probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm SampleMat that, on input 1n, outputs a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq and a full-rank set S ⊂ Λ⊥q (A), where the
distribution of A is statistically close to uniform over Zn×mq and the length ‖S‖ ≤ L = m2.5.
Also, by [MG02, Lemma 7.1, page 129], S can be converted efficiently to a “good” basis T of Λ⊥q (A) such that
‖T̃‖ ≤ ‖S̃‖ ≤ L.
Lemma 4.6 ([GPV08]Preimage Samplable Functions). For any prime q = poly(n), any m ≥ 5n lg q, and any
s ≥ L · ω(
√
logm), it holds that there exist PPT algorithms TrapGen,SampleD,SamplePre such that:
1. TrapGen computes (A,T) ←R TrapGen(1n, 1m), where A ∈ Zm×nq is statistically close to uniform and T ⊂
Λ⊥q (A) is a good basis with ‖T̃‖ ≤ L. The matrix A (and q) are public, while the good basis T is the trapdoor.
2. SampleD samples vectors ~e from DZ`×m,s.
3. The trapdoor inversion algorithm SamplePre(A,T, s,U) outputs a matrix Z ∈ Z`×m such that U = ZA.
In addition, it holds that the following distributions D1, D2 are statistically close:
D1 := (A,Z,U), s.t. (A,T)←R TrapGen(1n, 1m),U←R Z`×n,
Z←R SamplePre(A,T, s,U)
D2 := (A,Z,ZA), where A←R Zm×nq ,Z←R DZ`×m,s : ‖~zi‖ ≤ s
√
m, i ∈ {1 . . .m}










ct1 ← A~s+ ~f1









Zid ←R SamplePre(A,T, ρ,Uid)
Return (~y, skid,~y := (~y> · Zid))
Dec
(
ct1, ct2, skid,~y, ~y):
µ = ~y> · ct2 − skid,~y · ct1
µ′ = argminµ′∈{0...K+1}
∣∣∣⌊ qK ⌋ · µ− µ′∣∣∣
Return µ′
Fig. 11. An identity-based inner-product functional encryption scheme IFE in the random-oracle model, where H denotes the
random oracle. Algorithms TrapGen and SamplePre are referenced in Lemma 4.6
Noise Rerandomization. The following procedure NoiseGen(R, s) for noise rerandomization, was described in
[KY16]. NoiseGen(R, s): given a matrix R ∈ Zm×t, and s ∈ R+ such that s2 > s1(RR>), it first samples
~e1 := R~e+ (s
2Im −RR>)
1
2~e′, where Im ∈ Zm×m denotes the identity matrix, and ~e←R Dtσ and ~e′ ←R Dm√2σ are
independent spherical continuous Gaussian noises. Then, it samples ~e2 ←R DZm−~e1,s√2σ , and returns ~e1 + ~e2 ∈ Z
m
q
. We have the following lemma:
Lemma 4.7 (Noise Distribution [KY16]). Let R ←R Zm×t and s > s1(R). The following distributions are statis-
tically close:
Distribution 1: ~e←R DZt,σ and ~e′ ←R NoiseGen(R, s). Output R~e+ ~e′.
Distribution 2: Output e←R DZm,2sσ .
4.2 Our Construction
In this section, we describe how to obtain an identity-based inner-product funtional encryption scheme based on
the hardness of LWE in the random-oracle model. Our idea is to start with a modification of the ALS functional
encryption scheme for inner-products [ALS16], proposed by [WFL19] and which we recall in Appendix A. We modify
the identity-based encryption scheme of [GPV08] in such a way as to support functional key generation queries, as in
ALS. Our construction is described in Fig. 11. Ciphertexts encode vectors ~x ∈ X := {0, . . . , P −1}` under an identity
id. Secret keys correspond to an identity id and a vector ~y ∈ Y := {0, . . . , V − 1}`. When the identities match, our
scheme decrypts the bounded inner-product 〈~x, ~y〉 ∈ {0, . . . ,K − 1} where K = `PV .
Since our construction achieves anonymity and the size of input vectors ~x are fixed, no partial information about
the input is leaked. That is, part(~x, id) =⊥.
Lemma 4.8 (Correctness). For q ≥ 2K`
√






`), ρ ≥ ω(
√
log n),m = 2n log q,
the scheme from Fig. 11 is correct.
















This decrypts correctly as long as the error terms are small. From Lemma 4.2, we know that every entry of Z is
with overwhelming probability bounded by ω(log n), so ‖Z‖ ≤
√
` · ω(log n), as long as ρ ≥ ω(
√
log n). We
use Lemma 4.2 once again and we bound ‖~y>Z~e1‖ ≤ `
√
`V ω(log2 n) and ‖~y~e2‖ ≤ `V ω(
√




log n). For decryption to succeed, we want that the error terms are smaller than q2K , which implies:
q ≥ 2K`
√
`V ω(log2 n), which is the case for our choice of parameters.
Remark 4.9 (No smudging noise). We remark that in our setup, we rely on efficient lattice parameters and require no
smudging or superpolynomial modulus.
Theorem 4.10 (Security). Let n be the security parameter, q ≥ 2K`
√

















, then the scheme from Fig. 11 is AD-IND-secure in the
random-oracle model, assuming that LWEq,α,n is hard.
Proof. We prove adaptive security in the random-oracle model, following the proof structure and techniques of
[GPV08], while making several changes to adapt the proof techniques to functional encryption. First, without loss
of generality, we assume that any adversary making key generation queries of the form id‖~y will first query the ran-
dom oracle on id (we can make this assumption because for every adversary A, we can compile it into an adversary
A′ that exhibits this behavior). We proceed in a series of hybrids, consider A to be a PPT adversary, and n ∈ N to be
the security parameter. We denote by AdvGamei(A) the advantage of A in game i.
Game 0 This is the original AD-IND game.
Game 1 In this game, we guess what identities id∗0 and id
∗





themselves would incur an exponential security loss. Therefore, instead of guesssing the identities themselves, we
guess the index of the random-oracle query in which the adversary queries the oracle H to get Uid∗0 and Uid∗1 . This
will result in an 1Q2 security loss, where Q is the total number of queries to the random oracle. As explained above,
we are guaranteed that the adversary will make this query.
Depending on whether id∗0 = id
∗
1, we will either perform a reduction to the ALS scheme (see Appendix A) or
directly to LWE.
Case 1, id∗0 = id
∗
1 We perform a reduction to the security of the ALS [ALS16] encryption scheme, which we recall in
Appendix A. We reduce to the AD-IND security of ALS. We first obtain from the challenger public keys AALS,DALS.
Now, equipped with the knowledge of id∗, we define Game1 to be the same as Game0, except for the following
changes:
– Matrix A is not generated with TrapGen anymore, instead A is now replaced with AALS.
– For every id 6= id∗ query to the random oracle H , we draw a matrix Zid ←R DZ`×m,ρ. We program the random oracle
H(id) = Uid, where Uid is now computed as Uid = ZidA.
Key queries of the form id‖~y are answered by returning ~y>Zid.
– For id = id∗, we program H(id) = DALS.
– For key queries of the form id∗‖~y, we notice that we cannot answer them ourselves. However, we are allowed to
forward ~y to the challenger of the AD-IND security of ALS, which replies with ~y>ZALS, where ZALS is the master
secret key of the ALS scheme. We set skid∗‖~y := ~y>ZALS and forward it to the adversary.
– When the adversary finally submits its challenge (~x0, ~x1), we forward this to the ALS challenger, which replies with
ct := (ct1, ct2). We forward ct back to the adversary.
We therefore have that AdvGame1(A) ≤ AdvALS(A), now we only need to show that |AdvGame0(A)−AdvGame1(A)| ≤
negl(n). For this we use Lemma 4.6, which tells us that:
For any id 6= id∗ , D0 := (A,Zid,Uid), where (A,T)←R TrapGen(1n),Uid ←R Z`×n, Zid ←R SamplePre(A,T,
s,Uid), (which is the same as the adversarial view in Game0) is statistically close to D1 := (A,Zid,ZidA), where
A←R Zm×nq ,Zid ←R DZ`×m : ‖~zi‖ ≤ s
√
m (recall that ~zi denotes the i-th row of Z). Note that in ALS, matrix AALS
is indeed uniformly random, which corresponds to how A is chosen in Game1.
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Finally, when id = id∗, we need to argue that ALS public keys are distributed statistically close to honestly generated
keys in Game0. Note that in ALS, the second matrix DALS is not uniformly random like in Game0, but instead is of
the form DALS = ZALSAALS (in fact in can be proven that U is not statistically close to uniformly random). However,
this is not an issue in our case, as the distribution of Uid∗ is in fact uniform conditioned on it being of the form Zid∗A.
Therefore, we can apply Lemma 4.6 once again, and conclude that (A,Zid∗ ,Uid∗) with trapdoored A and uniform
Uid∗ is statistically close to (A,Zid∗ ,Zid∗A).
Case 2, id∗0 6= id
∗
1 In this case, we make the following observation: if the adversary was allowed to obtain secret
keys for either id∗0‖~y or id
∗
1‖~y, for any ~y, then it could trivially distinguish between encryptions of ~x0 under id
∗
0 and
encryptions of ~x1 under id∗1. This type of trivial attack is excluded by the AD-IND definition, therefore we conclude
that the adversary cannot obtain decryption key queries for neither id∗0 or id
∗
1. With this limitation, we can perform
a reduction directly to LWE for matrix B =
 AUid∗0
Uid∗1
 ∈ Z(m+2`)×nq , where B is uniformly random. We obtain a
ciphertext ~c = (~c1,~c2,~c3) from the LWE oracle. To simulate the view of A, we set H(id∗0) = Uid∗0 and H(Uid∗1 ). For
all the other keys, we proceed as in the previous case:
1. For every id /∈ {id∗0, id
∗
1} query to the random oracle H , we draw a matrix Zid ←R DZ`×m,ρ. We program the
random oracle H(id) = Uid, where Uid is now computed as Uid = ZidA.
2. For every id /∈ {id∗0, id
∗
1}, key queries of the form id‖~y are answered by returning ~y>Zid.
Challenge queries to answer a challenge encryption for ~x0 under id∗0 or ~x1 under id
∗
1, we pick uniformly at random a











· ~x1), if β = 1
If the LWE oracle outputs a uniformly random element, then AdvGame1(A) ≤ AdvLWEq,α,n(A) and the view is
identical to Game1. When the LWE oracle outputs an element of the form ~c = B~d + ~g, with ~d ←R Znq and ~g ←R
DZm+2` , the split into (~c0,~c1,~c2) ∈ Zmq × (Z`q)2 produces ciphertexts formed exactly as in Game0.
We are left to argue that (A,Uid∗0 ,Uid∗1 ) in Game1 is distributed statistically close as in Game2, which is the case
by Lemma 4.6.
We have thus proven that:
AdvIND-FE-CPA(A) ≤ 1Q2 max(AdvLWEq,α,n(A),AdvLWEq,σ/q,n(A)) ≤
1
Q2AdvLWEq,α,n(A),
where Q is the number of random-oracle queries.
5 A Lattice-Based Identity-Based Functional Encryption in the Standard Model
In this section, we present a lattice-based IFE construction for the inner-product functionality in the standard model.
However, before doing so, we first recall some known results that we are going to use in our construction and security
proofs.
5.1 Preliminaries
Lemma 5.1 ([BGG+14]). Let n, m, q > 0 be integers, where q prime. There exist polynomial time algorithms, such
that:
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– TrapGen(1n, 1m, q) → (A,TA) ([Ajt99, AP09, MP12]): a PPT algorithm that, for m = Θ(n log q), outputs a full-
rank A ∈ Zn×mq and a basis TA ∈ Zm×m for Λ⊥q (A). In addition, A is negl(n)-close to uniform and ‖T̃A‖ =
O(
√
n log q), with overwhelming probability in n.
– ExtendRight(A,TA,B) → T(A|B) ([CHKP10]): a deterministic algorithm that for full-rank A,B ∈ Zn×mq and a
basis TA ∈ Zm×m of Λ⊥q (A), outputs a basis T(A|B) of Λ⊥q (A|B). In addition ‖T̃A‖ = ‖T̃(A|B)‖.
– ExtendLeft(A,G,TG,S) → T(A|G+AS) ([ABB10]): a deterministic algorithm that for full-rank A,G ∈ Zn×mq
and a basis TG of Λ⊥q (G), outputs a basis T(A|G+AS) of Λ
⊥
q (A|G+AS). In addition ‖T̃(A|G+AS)‖ ≤ ‖T̃G‖(1+
‖S‖2).




Theorem 5.2 (SampleLeft [ABB10]). Let q > 2, full rank A,B ∈ Zn×mq with m > n, a basis TA of Λ⊥q (A), a
matrix U ∈ Zn×`q and σ > ‖T̃A‖ · ω(
√
logm). Then there exists PPT algorithm SampleLeft(A,TA,B,U, σ) that
outputs a matrix X ∈ Z2m×`q , distributed statistically close to DΛ~uq (A|B),σ .
Theorem 5.3 (SampleRight [ABB10, CHKP10]). Let q > 2, full rank A ∈ Zn×mq with m > n, matrices S ∈
Zm×mq , U ∈ Zn×`q , y 6= 0 ∈ Zq and σ =
√
5 · (1 + ‖S‖2) · ω(
√
logm). Then there exists PPT algorithm
SampleRight(A,S, y,U, σ) that outputs a matrix X ∈ Z2m×`q , distributed statistically close to DΛ~uq (A|AS+yG),σ ,
where G is the gadget matrix from Lemma 5.1.
Lemma 5.4 (Bounding the Norm of a {±1}k×m Matrix [ABB10]). Let R be a matrix chosen uniformly at random
from {±1}k×m. There exists a universal constant C ′, for which:
Pr[‖R‖ ≥ C ′
√
k +m] < 1
ek+m
.
Lemma 5.5 ([Cai98] Gram-Schmidt Minimum). For any arbitrary integer lattice Λ, it holds that:
1 ≤ min
B
‖B̃‖ ≤ λ1(Λ∗) ·O(n),
with the minimum is over all (ordered) bases B of lattice Λ.
Lemma 5.6 ([ABB10]). Let q prime and m > (n + 1) log q + ω(log n). Let S be chosen uniformly from {±1}m×k
mod q, with k polynomial in n. Let A, B be chosen uniformly from Zn×mq and Zn×kq . Then, for every ~e ∈ Zmq , we
have that the distributions (A,AS,S>~e) and (A,B,S>~e) are statistically close.
To encode identities, we need to recall the following definition from [ABB10]:
Definition 5.7 ([ABB10] Encoding Identities as Matrices). Let q be a prime and n a positive integer. We say that a
function H : Znq → Zn×nq is an encoding with full-rank differences when:
– for all distinct u, v ∈ Znq , the matrix H(u)−H(v) ∈ Zn×nq has full-rank
– H must also be computable in polynomial time in n log q.
A scheme for encodings with full-rank differences has been introduced by [ABB10].
Definition 5.8 (Identity-Based Encryption). An Identity-Based Encryption scheme is a tuple of four algorithms
(Setup,Extract,Encrypt,Decrypt). The first algorithm, Setup produces some public parameters pk and a master
secret key mk. Extract(mk, id) generates private keys skid, associated to any given identity id. Encrypt produces en-
cryptions under a target identity id using the public parameters pk, and Decrypt will take as input a key skid and a
ciphertext ct of some message x - it will recover the initial message x if ct = Enc(pk, id, x).
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Definition 5.9 (Indistinguishability from Random). This security notion for IBE implies both indistinguishability
and receiver anonymity (meaning that for every id, without skid, one is not able to determine whether any ciphertext is
encrypted under id). Moreover, any ciphertext should be indistinguishable from a uniformly random element from the
ciphertext space. More formally, consider the following security game for any stateful PPT adversary A, and every




x∗ ← AExtract(·) (pk)
ct? ←R C
if β = 0 then ct? ← Enc(pk, id∗, x∗)
β′ ← AExtract(·) (pk, ct?)
Output: β′
where C is the ciphertext space. Extract(·) is an oracle that on input id, outputs Extract(mk, id), only if id 6= id∗.
An identity encryption scheme is INDr-sID-CPA-secure if for every PPT adversary A, the following advantage is
a negligible function of λ:
AdvINDr-sID-CPAA (λ) =







In this section, we combine the construction idea showcased in Section 4 with the standard-model IBE of [ABB10].
Similarly to the random-oracle model, we prove the resulting scheme anonymous, a property inherited by the under-
lying IBE scheme [ABB10] we build on. What we obtain is a scheme which is selectively secure with respect to the
identities id∗0, id
∗
1 used for the challenges ~x0 and ~x1. Since the scheme will make use once again of ALS as a build-
ing block, the security will be adaptive with respect to the challenge vectors ~x0, ~x1 themselves. The construction is
described in Fig. 12. From our choice of q, this error is small enough to allow correct decryption.
Parameters Recall that plaintext vectors ~x ∈ X = {0, . . . , P − 1}, decryption key vectors ~y ∈ Y = {0, . . . , V − 1}
and when identities match, we recover 〈~x, ~y〉 ∈ {0, . . . ,K − 1} with K = `PV . A first-time reader may want to
skip this paragraph, as it references steps of the proof. Combining the ALS requirements from Appendix A with the
parameters from [ABB10]. our scheme parameters must satisfy the following:
– We start with ALS parameters nALS (the security parameter), qALS, σALS, ρALS, mALS = 2nALS log q, n = nALS, αALS,
chosen as in Appendix A.
– From the ALS reduction in Game5, σ = σALS, q = qALS, n = nALS. m = mALS, ρ = ρALS.
– SampleLeft and SampleRight, we require that ρ > m · ω(
√
logm).
– TrapGen requires that m > 6n log q.
– Leftover hash lemma, this carries over from ALS parameters.
– Guessing TA step: ρ > n · ω(
√
n). Notice that increasing ρALS can be done without invalidating LWE security. We
only need to increase qALS to satisfy correctness.
– Hardness of LWE: αq > 2
√
n.
– NoiseGen: The spectral norm of S∗ can be upper-bounded (by using the Frobenius norm) by s1(S∗) ≤ m. Using









– Correctness: q > 2K`V (σ + τ) + C ′σρ4m
√
`nmV .
Therefore, we choose ALS parameters, and then modify the following to satisfy our additional constraints:
• m ≥ 6n log q.











Hid ← (A|B+H(id) ·G)
Rid ←R SampleLeft(A,TA,B+H(id) ·G,D, ρ)
Return (~y, skid,~y := (Rid · ~y))
Enc(mpk, id, ~x):






~f ← (Im|S)> · ~e1
ct1 ← H>id~s+ ~f
ct2 = D









ct1, ct2, skid,~y, ~y):
µ = ~y> · ct2 − sk>id,~y · ct1
µ′ = argminµ′∈{0...K+1}
∣∣∣⌊ qK ⌋ · µ− µ′∣∣∣
Return µ′
Fig. 12. An identity-based inner-product functional encryption scheme IFE . Function H is an encoding with full-rank difference,
as in Definition 5.7. Algorithms TrapGen and SampleLeft are described in Lemma 5.1 and Theorem 5.2. Noise ~e3 is non-smudging
and is of a different standard deviation τ , this is needed for the security proof.





Lemma 5.10 (Decryption correctness). For parameters n,m, q, σ, ρ, τ , chosen as in the previous paragraph, the
scheme from Fig. 11 is correct.





〈~x, ~y〉 − ~y>R>idH>id~s − ~y>R>id ~f . We know that






〈~x, ~y〉+ ~y>~e2 + ~y>~e3 − ~y>R>id ~f︸ ︷︷ ︸
error terms
By Lemma 4.2, we now bound the error terms, by rewritting them as: ~y>~e2 + ~y>~e3 − ~y>R>id ~f = ~y>~e2 + ~y>~e3 −
~y>R>id(Im|S)>~e1. Since Rid ∈ Z2m×nq , we know that ‖Rid‖ ≤ ρ
√
2mn. Also ‖S‖ ≤ C
√





` and ‖~e3‖ ≤ τ
√
`. Now, ‖~y‖ ≤
√
`V , therefore ‖~y>~e2‖ ≤ σ`V , ‖~y>~e3‖ ≤ τ`V and ‖~y>R>id(Im|S)>~e1‖ ≤
C ′σρ4m
√
`nmV , where the last inequality is derived from Lemma 5.4. Therefore, the final error term is upper
bounded by `V (σ + τ) + C ′σρ4m
√
`nmV .
Remark 5.11 (Inheriting Anonymity). Towards proving security, we recall the observation made during the proof of
our random-oracle construction. Assume that id∗0 6= id
∗
1 - if the adversary was allowed to obtain secret keys for either
id∗0‖~y or id
∗
1‖~y, for any ~y, then it could trivially distinguish between encryptions of ~x0 under id
∗
0 and encryptions of ~x1
under id∗1. This type of trivial attack is excluded by the SEL-IND definition, therefore we conclude that the adversary
cannot obtain decryption key queries for neither id∗0 or id
∗
1. Then, there are no functional keys and the adversary
interacts with what is essentially an identity-based encryption scheme (in our case, exactly the scheme of [ABB10]).
Therefore, since [ABB10] satisfies INDr-sID-CPA (see Definition 5.9), our scheme will trivially also satisfy the same
security notion.
We can now state the following security theorem:
Theorem 5.12 (SEL-IND Security). Let n be the security parameter and consider the ALS functional encryption
scheme (Appendix A) with parameters q, σ, ρ, m, n, α. As long as ALS is secure under the LWEq,α,n and the ALS
parameters satisfy in addition m ≥ 6n log q, q > 2K`V (σ + τ) + C ′σρ4m
√
`nmV , the scheme in Fig. 12 with




m) is SEL-IND secure under the LWEq,α,n assumption.
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Proof. Since the case of id∗0 6= id
∗
1 follows from Remark 5.11, we focus on the more difficult case when id
∗ = id∗0 =
id∗1. The proof follows the outline of the original [ABB10]. The novelty is the adaptation for supporting functional
decryption keys. An additional step we did not encounter in the random oracle construction is that here, when matrix
A is switched from its trapdoored version to uniformly random, the simulator still needs to have access to a short basis
in order to answer key decryption queries for the case id∗. This is a difference from the proof of [ABB10], where they
do not need to answer any queries for the punctured identity id∗. Since our proof is selective with respect to the identity
of the challenges, we assume that we have access to id∗. We also make use of noise rerandomization and correction
techniques from [KY16], which is why we require an additional non-smudging noise ~e3.
Game 0 This is the original SEL-IND game, the challenge plaintexts are (~x0, ~x1).
Game 1 Instead of choosing (A,T) ←R TrapGen(1n, 1m), choose A to be uniformly random. To compute de-
cryption keys, we can enumerate all short possible basis TA of Λ⊥q (A) and use one of these short basis to generate
decryption keys. This game is inefficient and indistinguishable from the previous one by the properties of TrapGen()
(see Lemma 5.1). Since the indistinguishability is derived from a statistical argument, it is not problematic that this
game is inefficient.
However, we need to ensure that the lattice spanned by A actually has a short basis. For this, we use Lemma 5.5,
which says that: minB‖B̃‖ ≤ O(n), which means that in order to use the SampleD algorithm, we need to set our
standard deviation ρ > n ·ω(
√
n). This will require us to increase the standard deviation ρ used in SampleLeft, which
in turn will lead to a larger modulus than in our random oracle scheme.
Game 2 In this game, we switch the computation of D to be programmed to D = Hid∗Z, where Z ←R DZ2m×n,ρ,
using SampleD. We now justify that this change is (statistically) indistinguishable for the adversary. Recall that Hid∗ =
(A|B+H(id∗)G). Since B and A are uniformly random, we can apply Lemma 4.6 and argue that Hid∗Z = (A|B+
H(id∗)G)Z is close to uniformly random over Zn×` (which is how D was generated in Game1).
The role of Rid∗ is played by Z. Use Z to answer decryption key queries for id = id∗, as skid∗‖~y = Z · y. For all
other decryption key queries, we still compute Rid ←R SampleLeft(A,TA,B+H(id)G,D) and output Rid∗~y
Game 3 Matrix TA must still be found by enumeration. The matrix S∗ which will be chosen for the challenge
ciphertext is now picked at ley generation, just as in [ABB10]. B is now chosen as B = AS∗ − H(id∗)G. ~f :=
(Im|S)>~e1. By Lemma 5.6, we know that if A is uniform over Zn×mq and S uniform over {±1}m×m, the distribution
(A,B, (S∗)>~e1) is statistically close to (A,AS∗, (S∗)>~e1), where B is uniform over Zn×mq . Note that the distributions
are close for any choice of ~e, so ~e can be known to a distinguishing adversary in this step.
Game 4 This game is now efficient. Use SampleRight(A,S, H(id) − H(id∗),D, ρ) with standard deviation ρ to
generate Rid, for id 6= id∗. This is possible due to the identity encoding function (Definition 5.7), which ensures that
H(id)−H(id∗) is non-zero, one of the requirements of the SampleRight algorithm. For id = id∗, the decryption keys
are generated using the secret matrix Z. This game is indistinguishable from the previous game due to Theorem 5.2,
which says that the computed Zid is statistically close to DΛUq (A|AS+(H(id)−H(id∗)G),σ . This holds as long as the
standard deviation ρ satisfies the constraints of Theorem 5.3.
Game 5 In this final game, we rely on the security of ALS to argue indistinguishability of ciphertexts. We interact with
the AD-CPA challenger for ALS. We receive as public keys AALS and DALS. We simulate the view of the adversary
in the following manner:
– Setup: set A := A>ALS, pick Z2 ←R DZn×m,σ,S∗ ←R {±1}m×m and set D = DALS +AS∗Z2.






we can compute since we know Z2.
32
– Decryption keys for id 6= id∗: Using SampleRight as in previous games.
– Challenge ciphertext upon receiving ~x0, ~x1 from the adversary, we forward them to the ALS challenger and receive
(ctALS1 , ct
ALS














In this game the advantage of the adversary is upper bounded by the advantage of breaking the ALS scheme. It





. Then the fact that
(A‖AS∗)Rid∗ = D translates to the fact that AZ1 + AS∗Z2 = D. The second matrix Z2 we can simply sample
from DZn×m,ρ,c, while S∗ is known and D is programmable (since Game2). Now we set A> = AALS and implicitly
Z>1A
> = DALS (Recall that Z1 is the master secret key of ALS, so we do not have access to it). Notice that:

























· ~x+ ~e2 + ~e3 = ctALS2 + Z>2(S∗)>ctALS1 + NoiseGen(Z>2(S∗)>, s)
As already explained in our parameter section, we can upper-bound s1(Z>2(S
∗)) and we let s > s1(Z>2(S
∗)). To
conclude, by the properties of NoiseGen(Z>2(S
∗)>, s), we know that the noise in ct2 will be statistically close to
~e2 + ~e3, therefore Game5 is statistically close to Game4.
6 Multi-Input Inner-Product Functional Encryption with Rich Access Control
In this section, we build a multi-input FE scheme for the family of functions Fmultiipfe(d,B),P1,...,Pn for a dimension d ∈ N,
a bound B ∈ N, and n predicates P1, . . . ,Pn ∈ P , where each predicate takes as input an attribute in the universe
U , and returns a bit. Each function is described by a set of indices S ⊆ [n], and for each index ∈ S , an associated




i ~yi ∈ [0, ndB2] if
Pi(atti) = 1 for all i ∈ S.
Note that to each input slot corresponds to a different predicate Pi, which represents a different policy access to
the encrypted data. For instance, some medical data can be considered very sensitive, and should only be computed
on by doctors, whereas other records might be slightly less sensitive, and could pertain to the output of a computation
performed by a user with lower credentials, say, a health insurance company. Each functional secret key permits to
compute a weighted sum on some part of the data for which it has credentials (this is represented by the set S). That
is, a key decrypts successfully provided it is associated with attributes that satisfy the predicates associated with the
encrypted data on which it computes.
Our construction generically transforms any single-input FE for the family of functions Fipfe(d+1,B),P (described
in Section 3) satisfying some structural properties into an MIFE for the family of functions Fmultiipfe(d,B),P1,...,Pn . We first
recall the definition of multi-input FE and then describe our construction.
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6.1 Definitions
Definition 6.1 (Multi-Input Functional Encryption [GGG+14]). Let F be a family of n-ary functions, with f ∈ F
defined as f : Xn → Y . A functional encryption scheme for F consists of the following algorithms:
– Setup(1λ,F): takes as input the security parameter λ and a description of the function family F , and outputs a
master public key mpk (which is implicitly part of the inputs of all other algorithms), a master secret key msk, and
n encryption keys ek1, . . . , ekn.
– Enc(eki, xi): takes as input an encryption key eki, a message xi ∈ X , and outputs a ciphertext cti.




skf , (ct1, . . . , ctn)
)
: takes as input the functional decryption key skf along with ciphertexts (ct1, . . . , ctn).
It outputs a value y ∈ Y or the special symbol ⊥ if it fails.




skf , (ct1, . . . , ctn)
)
=
f(x1, . . . , xn)
]
= 1 where the probability is taken over (mpk,msk, (ek1, . . . , ekn))← Setup(1λ,F), cti ← Enc(eki, xi)
for all i ∈ [n], skf ← KeyGen(msk, f).
Definition 6.2 (AD-IND security). For every functional encryptionMIFE , every security parameter λ, every state-
ful adversary A, we define the following experiments for β ∈ {0, 1}:
Experiment AD-INDFEβ (1λ,A):
(mpk,msk, (ek1, . . . , ekn))← Setup(1λ,F)
β′ ← AOCorrupt(·),OKeyGen(·),OEnc(·,·,·)(mpk)
Output: β′
where n is the number of users; on input i ∈ [n], the oracle OCorrupt(i) returns eki and adds i to the set Corr of
corrupted users; on input tuples of the form (i, x0, x1) where i ∈ [n], x0, x1 ∈ X , the oracle OEnc(i, x0, x1) returns
Enc(eki, x
β) and adds (i, x0, x1) to the list of queries, denoted by Q; on input a function f ∈ F of arity n, the oracle
OKeyGen(f) returns the functional decryption key skf ← KeyGen(msk, f).
We denote by I the set of pairs
(








where for all i ∈ Hon, (i, x0i , x1i ) ∈ Q and for all i ∈
Corr, x0i = x
1
i ∈ X . We require that for all functions f queried to OKeyGen, we have: f(x01, . . . , x0`) = f(x11, . . . , x1`)
for all pairs
(









Moreover, we require that for all users i that are corrupted during the game, all the queries of the form (i, x0, x1) ∈
Q are such that x0 = x1.
Using generic transformations from [ABKW19, Gay19], which build upon [AGRW17, DOT18], we can assume
without loss of generality that, if i ∈ Hon, then there exists a query (i, x0i , x1i ) ∈ Q.
A multi-input functional encryption scheme FE is AD-IND-secure if for every PPT adversary A, the following
advantage is a negligible function of λ:
AdvAD-INDFE,A (λ) =
∣∣Pr [AD-INDFE0 (1λ,A) = 1]− Pr [AD-INDFE1 (1λ,A) = 1]∣∣
We define one-time security with its associated games ONE-AD-INDFEb and advantage Adv
ONE-AD-IND
FE,A (λ) similarly,
except the adversary can make at most one query of the form (i, x0i , x
1
i ) for each slot i ∈ [n].
There are weaker security notions, where the set of corrupted users Corr, or the set of queries Q is chosen before-
hand by the adversary. The former restriction is referred to as static corruptions, whereas the second restriction is
referred to as selective security.
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6.2 Generic Construction
We show that the techniques used in [ACF+18, AGRW17] to generically transform any single-input FE for in-
ner products into a multi-input FE for inner products are compatible with our single-input FE. Thus, we obtain
an MIFE for the family of functions Fmultiipfe(d,B),P1,...,Pn , described in Fig. 13, which relies on any single-input FE
(Setup′,Enc′,KeyGen′,Dec′) for the family of functions Fipfe(d+1,B),P , such as described in Section 3, satisfying the
following properties:
1. Pairing-based: ciphertexts contain groups elements in G1 and functional decryption keys contain groups elements
in G2, for a pairing group PG = (G1,G2,GT , p, P1, P2, e)← PGGen(1λ), with p B.
2. Large inputs: The algorithms Enc′ and KeyGen′ can take as input arbitrary vectors in Zdp (as opposed to vectors
in [0, B]d for a polynomial bound B) and the decryption returns [~x>~y]T ∈ GT .
3. Linear homomorphism: There is a PPT algorithm Add such that for all ~x, ~x′ ∈ Zdp and P ∈ P , the following are
identically distributed: (Enc′(mpk,P, ~x),Enc′(mpk,P, ~x+~x′)) and (Enc′(mpk,P, ~x),Add(Enc′(mpk,P, ~x), ~x′)).
That is, Add can produce a fresh encryption of ~x+ ~x′ from an encryption of ~x, for a given predicate P ∈ P .
It is not hard to verify that our scheme in Section 3.1 satisfies these properties.
Setup(1λ,Fmultiipfe(d,B),P1,...,Pn):
For all i ∈ [n]: (mpki,mski)← Setup′(1λ,Fipfe(d,B),P), ~ui ←R Zdp.
Return mpk := {mpki}i∈[n], msk := {mski, ~ui}i∈[n], {eki := ~ui}i∈[n].
Enc(eki, ~xi):
cti ← Enc′ (mpki,Pi, ~xi + ~ui mod p). Return cti.
KeyGen(msk,S, (attj , ~yj)j∈S):

















S, {sk′j}j∈S , z
)
For all j ∈ S, [dj ]T ← Dec′(sk′j , ctj). [out]T :=
∑
j∈S [dj ]T − [z]T . Return out.
Fig. 13. MIFE for the family Fmultiipfe(d,B),P1,...,Pn , where P1, . . . ,Pn ∈ P . Here, FE
′ := (Setup′,Enc′,KeyGen′,Dec′) is a SEL-
IND secure FE for the family Fipfe(d,B),P , satisfying the structural properties listed in Section 6.2.
Correctness. Let S ⊆ [n], ~xi ∈ [0, B]d for i ∈ [n], ~yj ∈ [0, B]d, attj ∈ U for j ∈ S , such that for all j ∈ S,





j ~yj + ~u
>




j ~yj ]T , and the decryption can efficiently recover out, since the
output belongs to [0, ndB2], which is polynomially bounded.
Theorem 6.3 (IND security). The MIFE presented in Fig. 4MIFE is AD-IND secure (respectively SEL-IND se-
cure) as long as the underlying single-input FE FE ′ is AD-IND secure (respectively SEL-IND secure). Namely, for
any PPT adversary A, there exists a PPT adversary B such that:
AdvAD-INDMIFE,A(λ) ≤ n · Adv
AD-IND
FE′,B (λ) + negl(λ).
Similarly, for any PPT adversary A, there exists a PPT adversary B such that:
AdvSEL-INDMIFE,A(λ) ≤ n · Adv
SEL-IND
FE′,B (λ) + negl(λ).
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The proof, as in [ACF+18, AGRW17], proceeds in two steps, where we first prove perfect one-time security, then
boost it to many-time security using the many-time security of the underlying single-input FE. The adaptive and
selective settings have very similar proofs, thus, we only give the proof in the adaptive setting, which is the most
technical.
Proof. First, in Lemma 6.4, we show that for any adversary A, we have:
AdvONE-AD-INDMIFE,A (λ) = 0.
Next, for all PPT adversaries A, we show there exist PPT adversaries B1 and B2 such that:
AdvAD-INDMIFE,A(λ) ≤ Adv
ONE-AD-IND
MIFE,B1 (λ) + n · Adv
AD-IND
FE′,B2 (λ) + negl(λ).
The proof uses a series of hybrid games, described in Fig. 14. For game Gj for all j ∈ [1, 3], we denote by
Advj(A) the probability that game Gj outputs 1 when interacting with A. Here, for any input slot i ∈ [n], we denote
by (i, ~xj,0i , ~x
j,1
i ) the j-th query for slot i ∈ [n] (note that there can be many such queries for each slot).
It is clear that games G1 and G3 correspond to AD-INDFE0 (1λ,A) and AD-IND
FE
1 (1
λ,A), respectively. We show
in Lemma 6.5 that there exists a PPT adversary B1 such that
|Adv1(A)− Adv2(A)| ≤ AdvONE-AD-INDMIFE,B1 (λ).
We show in Lemma 6.6 that there exists a PPT adversary B2 such that
|Adv2(A)− Adv3(A)| ≤ n · AdvAD-INDFE′,B2 (λ) + negl(λ).
Lemma 6.4. For any adversary A, we have:
AdvONE-AD-INDMIFE,A (λ) = 0.
Proof. We first define a game G0, which samples a random bit β ←R {0, 1}, and a guess of all the queries (~w0i , ~w1i )←R
([0, B]d)2 for all i ∈ [n]. Then the experiment behaves as AD-INDFEβ (1λ,A). At the end of the experiment, the







i , then the experiment outputs β
′. Otherwise, it outputs a random bit β′ ←R {0, 1}. We define
the advantage AdvG0(λ) := 2 · |1/2− Pr[β′ = β|β′ ← G0]|. We have: AdvG0(λ) = B2dn · Adv
ONE-AD-IND
MIFE,A (λ).
Now, we show that AdvG0(λ) = 0, which implies that Adv
ONE-AD-IND
MIFE,A (λ) = 0. We use the fact that {~ui}i∈[n], is
identically distributed to {~ui + ~w1i − ~w0i }i∈[n], where ~ui, ~w0i , ~w1i ←R Zdp.






i for all i ∈ [n], the first distribution corresponds
to case where b = 0 in the experiment G0, with challenge ciphertexts of the form Enc′(mpki,Pi, ~x
0
i + ~ui mod p)








, whereas the second distribution corresponds to
the case where b = 1 in the experiment G0, with challenge ciphertexts of the form Enc′(mpki,Pi, ~x
0
i + (~ui + ~x
1
i −
~x0i ) mod p) = Enc
′(mpki,Pi, ~x
1
i + ~ui mod p) and keys of the form (S, {KeyGen
′(mski, atti, ~yi)}i∈S ,
∑
i∈S(~ui +
















i , by definition of
the security game.
Lemma 6.5 (From Game G1 to G2). There exists a PPT adversary B1 such that
|Adv1(A)− Adv2(A)| ≤ AdvONE-AD-INDMIFE,B1 (λ).
Proof. Adversary B1 receives mpk which it forwards to A. When A queries OKeyGen or OCorrupt, B forwards
the query to its own oracle and gives back the answer to A. When A queries OEnc(i, ~x1,0i , ~x1,1x ) on slot i ∈ [n]








x ) to OEnc, that is, for j > 1, B1




i ), which by property 3 is distributed as a fresh






i ). Note that in the case b = 0, this corresponds to the game
G1, whereas it corresponds to the game G2 when b = 1.
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Lemma 6.6 (From Game G2 to G3). There exists a PPT adversary B2 such that
|Adv2(A)− Adv3(A)| ≤ n · AdvAD-INDFE′,B2 (λ) + negl(λ).
Proof. We switch the distribution of the challenge ciphertexts output by OEnc, one slot i ∈ [n] at a time, using a
hybrid argument. To change the ciphertexts for slot i ∈ [n], we use the security of FE ′ on (mpki,mski). Namely,
the reduction B2 samples (mpkθ,mskθ) ←R Setup
′(Fipfe(d,B),P) for all θ 6= i and ~ui ←R Zdp for i ∈ [n], and it
uses these values to simulate mpk and answer the queries (θ, ~xj,0θ , ~x
j,1
θ ) for all θ 6= i. B2 can also answer queries
to OCorrupt, since it knows eki := ~ui for all i ∈ [n]. To answer A’s queries to OKeyGen, it uses its own oracle to
compute the sk′i component of the secret key and its knowledge of mskθ for all θ 6= i and ~ui for i ∈ [n] to compute the
remaining components, and forwards the answer to A. Upon receiving the queries (i, ~xj,0i , ~x
j,1





i + ~ui mod p, ~x
j,1
i + ~ui mod p) to its own experiment. The left challenge corresponds to the game











This is required by definition of the security game, since this information is given by the ideal functionality (correctness
of the scheme). For all i ∈ [n], any vector ~wi ∈ [−B, 2B]d, with probability at least 1 − 3dBp over the choice of













>~yi + (~ui mod p)
>~yi = ~x
j,1>
i ~yi + (~ui mod p)
>~yi = (~x
j,1
i + ~ui mod p)
>~yi.
That means the queries of B2 to its experiment are valid.
G1, G2 , G3 :




OEnc(i, ~xj,0i , ~x
j,1
i ):








OKeyGen(S, (attj , ~yj)j∈S):
skatt,~y ← KeyGen(msk,S, (attj , ~yj)j∈S).
Return skatt,~y .
Fig. 14. Hybrid games for the proof of Theorem 6.3.
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ct1 ← A~s+ ~e1









ct1, ct2, skid,~y, ~y):
µ = ~y> · ct2 − skid,~y · ct1
µ′ = argminµ′∈{0...K+1}
∣∣∣⌊ qK ⌋ · µ− µ′∣∣∣
Return µ′
Fig. 15. The ALS inner-product functional encryption scheme FE from [ALS16].
A The ALS inner-product functional encryption scheme
In this appendix, we recall the inner-product functional encryption scheme from [ALS16], which we denote as ALS.
The proof described here is the same as [ALS16], except for a small modification described in [WFL19]. The novelty
of [WFL19] is that they described how a rerandomization technique due to [KY16] can be used to simplify the proof
of the ALS scheme and improve its parameters. What is changed is that the matrix Z has a different distribution from
[ALS16], which allows us to combine this scheme with the random-oracle based IBE of [GPV08] and the standard
model IBE of [ABB10]. The construction is described in Fig. 15. This variant of ALS has the matrix Z←R DZ`×m,ρ,
rather than the slightly more complicated distribution in the original description of the scheme.
Choice of Parameters We first set X = {0, . . . , P − 1}`,Y = {0, . . . , V − 1}`, the output must belong to gs to
{0, . . . ,K − 1} with K = `PV . First we set the parameters for correctness:
– From Lemma 4.2, we know that every entry of D is with overwhelming probability bounded by ω(log n), so
‖D‖ ≤
√
` · ω(log n), as long as ρ ≥ ω(
√
log n).
– Now we bound ‖~y>D~e1‖ ≤ `
√
`V ω(log2 n) and ‖~y~e2‖ ≤ `V ω(
√
log n), as long as σ ≥ ω(
√
log n).
– For decryption to suceed, we want that the error terms are smaller than q2K , which implies: q ≥ 2K`
√
`V ω(log2 n)
We therefore have the following lemma:
Lemma A.1. For q ≥ 2K`
√
`V ω(log2 n), σ, ρ > ω(
√
log n) the ALS scheme from Fig. 15 is correct.
The security reduction is with respect to LWEq,α,n, where the modulus will be much larger thanK. Denote the standard
deviation r := αq. To ensure security, we need to satisfy the following requirements:
– NoiseGen rerandomization: looking ahead in the security proof, we require that the singular value s1(V) of V is






n)) (see the security proof for exact values and security parameter n). Then,
in order for NoiseGen to provide security guarantees, we must set σ ≥ 2 · r · h. Since h depends on the gaussian
parameter ρ of matrix Z, this establishes a relation between ρ and σ.
– Min-entropy requirement: since ρ > ω(
√
log n), the min-entropy requirement is satisfied (as long as n > 2.303)
and m ≥ (2n log q + 2n)/ log(4/3).
– Leftover hash lemma: this is satisfied as long as m is much larger than n (see [ALS16, Lemma 11]). For the
purposes of this paper, we will choose m = 2n log q.














m = 2n log q
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LWEq,α,n is reducible to lattice problems in dimension n when qα ≥ Ω(
√
n). With this choice of parameters, we have
the following theorem:








as described above. Then, the scheme from Fig. 15 is AD-IND-secure, assuming that LWEq,α,n is hard.
Proof. As mentioned previously, we recall the proof of the ALS scheme from [ALS16] in which Game 2 is modified
with the idea described in [WFL19].
Game 1 This is the AD-IND game.
Game 2 Draw an error ~e←R DZm,r and then compute ~c = A~s+~e. Let Im denote them×m identity matrix. Now we











λ) except with 1
e2πλ









By computing ~c′ = V~c + NoiseGen(V, σ′), we obtain ~c′ = V · ~c + ~f , where ~f ←R DZm+`,2rσ′ . Notice that we
can split ~c′ into ct1 ← A~s+ ~e1 and ct2 ← D~s+ ~e2, where e1 ← DZm,2rσ′ and e2 ← DZ`,2rσ′ . Now, to simulate ct2






Game 3 By the LWE assumption, we change~c = A~s+~e into a uniformly random element ~u of Zmq . Now we argue that
in this game, the probability the adversary has of winning is 12 . This step of the proof is identical to [ALS16, Theorem
2], which we recall here for completeness.
Consider ~yi the decryption key queries made by the adversary. Then, 〈~x0, ~yi〉 = 〈~x1, ~yi〉 over Z, for all i. Define
~x := 1g (~x1−~x0) =
1
g (x1, . . . , x`), where g 6= 0 is the gcd of all coefficients of ~x0−~x1. Since 〈~x, ~y
i〉 = 0, this means
all decryption key queries must belong to the lattice {~y ∈ Z` : 〈~x, ~y〉 = 0}. Assume without loss of generality that the
first n0 entries of ~x are zero, while the rest are non-zero.


















x2k) · ‖~x‖4. As long as q is large enough, this quantity is non-zero modulo q, which implies that Y is






where ~u←R Zmq .
The proof strategy of [ALS16] is to show that the distribution of Y · ct2 ∈ Z`×1q is almost independent of β and
therefore the probability of winning the game is almost 12 .





· ~xβ) mod q.





. Now Ytopct2 does not depend on β because Ytop · ~x0 = Ytop · ~x1, from the
functional encryption constraints.
It remains to analyze Ybotct2. Here, [ALS16] prove the following variant of the leftover hash lemma:
Lemma A.3. [ALS16] Conditioned on (A,ZA,Ytop,YtopZ), the min-entropy of YbotZ is greater or equal than
n log q + 2λ.
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This lemma can be applied as long as the following lemma due to [PR06] and adapted in [ALS16] holds for the
standard deviation used to generate Z:
Lemma A.4. [ALS16] Let Λ = k · Z be a 1-dimensional lattice. For any σ ≥ 10 · k, b ∈ λ and c ∈ R, we have that
DΛ,σ,c(b) ≤ 3/4. In particular, we have H∞(DΛ,σ,c) ≥ 0.4, where H∞() denotes the min-entropy.
As long as the previous two lemmas hold, one can use the leftover hash lemma for the seed ~u and randomness YbotZ to
argue that given (A,ZA,Ytop,YtopZ), the pair (~u,YbotZ~u) is 1/2λ statistically close from the uniform distribution
over Zmq × Zq , therefore hiding β. The variant of the leftover hash lemma used is the following:
Lemma A.5 (Lemma 10 in [ALS16]). Let n,m, q ≥ 2 be positive integers. Assume that q = pk for p prime and
k ≥ 1. Assume further that m ≥ 2n log2 q. Let σ ≥ Ω(
√
n+ logm) and c ∈ Zm. Then for A ∈ Zm×nq sampled
uniformly and ~e ∈ Zm sampled from DZm,σ,c, the distribution of the pair (A, ~e> · A) is within statistical distance
2−Ω(n) of uniform over Zm×nq × Znq .
B Instantiations of Predicate Encodings
B.1 Inner-product encryption with short ciphertexts [BBG05]
The predicate is described by a vector ~y ∈ Znp , takes as input an attribute ~x ∈ Znp , and outputs 1 if ~x>~y = 0, 0
otherwise.
– Param: returns the parameters (n+ 2, |ct| = 1, |sk| = n+ 1).
– EncCt(~x): given ~x ∈ Znp returns a matrix C ∈ Z
(n+2)×1
p such that C>(v1, v2, ~w) = v1 + ~x> ~w ∈ Zp.
– EncKey(~y): given ~y ∈ Znp returns a matrix K ∈ Z
(n+3)×(n+1)
p such that K>(α, v1, v2, ~w) = (v2~y+ ~w, v1 +α) ∈
Zn+1p .
– Decode(~x, ~y): if ~x>~y = 0, it returns the vector ~d :=
−1~x
1
 ∈ Zn+2p .
B.2 Ciphertext-policy ABE for monotone span programs [GPSW06]
We recall the definition of read-once monotone span programs [KW93]. The predicate is described by a matrix M ∈
Z`×np , takes as input an attribute ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n, and outputs 1 if the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Znp is in the
column span of M~x, which denotes the collection of vectors {Mj : xj = 1} where Mj denotes the j’th column of
M. That is, ~x satisfies M if there exists constants ω1, . . . , ωn ∈ Zp such that∑
j:xj=1
ωjMj = (1, 0, . . . , 0) (2)
Observe that the constants {ωj}j∈[n] can be computed in time polynomial in the size of the matrix M via Gaussian
elimination.
– Param: returns the parameters (n+ `, |ct| = n, |sk| = n+ 1).
– EncCt(M): given M ∈ Zn×`p returns a matrix C ∈ Z
(n+2)×1
p such that C>(~w, ~u, γ) = (w1 + (γ, ~u)>M1, . . . ,
wn + (γ, ~u)
>Mn) ∈ Znp , where Mj denotes the j’th column of M.
– EncKey(~x): given ~x ∈ {0, 1}n, returns a matrix K ∈ Z(n+3)×(n+1)p such that K>(α, ~w, ~u, γ) = (γ+α, x1w1, . . . , xnwn) ∈
Zn+1p .
– Decode(~x, ~y): if ~x>~y = 0, it returns the vector ~d := (x1ω1, . . . , xnωn, 1, ω1, . . . , ωn) ∈ Z2n+1p .
More predicate encodings can be found in [CGW15], yielding inner-product encryption with short keys [BB04],
non-zero inner-product encryption (introduced in [AL10]), spatial encryption [BH08, BBG05, LW10], ciphertext-
policy for arithmetic span programs [CGW15].
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C Instantiations of Function Encodings
C.1 Identity-Based Inner-Product Functional Encryption
Each function is described by an identity id ∈ Zp and a vector ~y ∈ [0, B]d, takes as input another identity id′ ∈ Zp
and a vector ~x ∈ [0, B]d, and outputs ~x>~y if id = id′, 0 otherwise. The partial information part(~x, id) = id.
– Param: returns the parameters (2d, |ct| = d, |sk| = n+ 1).
– EncCt(~x, id): given ~x ∈ Znp and id ∈ Zp, returns a matrix C ∈ Z
(2d+1)×d
p such that C>(w0, ~w1, ~w2) = (w0~x +
~w1 + id~w2) ∈ Zdp.
– EncKey(~y, id′): given ~y ∈ Znp and id
′ ∈ Zp, returns a matrix K ∈ Z(2d+1)×1p such that K>(w0, ~w1, ~w2) =
~y>(~w1 + id
′ ~w2) ∈ Zp.
– Decode(id, id′, ~y): if ~x>~y = 0, it returns the vector ~d := (~y,−1) ∈ Zd+1p .
Correctness. Let id ∈ Zp, ~x, ~y ∈ [0, B]d, C := EncCt(~x, id), K := EncKey(~y, id) and ~d := Decode(id, id′, ~y). We
have (w0, ~w1, ~w2)>(C|K)~d = (w0~x+ ~w1 + id~w2)>~y − ~y>(~w1 + id~w2) = w0~x>~y.
Security. Let id0 = id1, id′ ∈ Zp, ~x0, ~x1, ~y ∈ [0, B]d for all b ∈ {0, 1}, Cb := EncCt(~xb, idb), K := EncKey(~y, id). If
id0 = id1 = id′, then it must be that ~y>~x0 = ~y>~x1. In that case, security relies on the fact that the following are identi-
cally distributed: ~w1 and ~w1 +~x1−~x0, for ~w1 ←R Zdp. The left most distribution corresponds to (w0|~w>1 |~w>2 )(C0|K)
whereas the rightmost distribution corresponds to (w0|~w>1 |~w>2 )(C1|K).
If id0 = id1 6= id′, the security relies on the fact that the following are identically distributed: (~w1 + id~w2, ~w1 +
id′ ~w2) and (~w1 + id~w2 + ~x1 − ~x0, ~w1 + id′ ~w2), where~w1, ~w2 ←R Zdp. The left most distribution corresponds to
(w0|~w>1 |~w>2 )(C0|K) whereas the rightmost distribution corresponds to (w0|~w>1 |~w>2 )(C1|K).
C.2 Orthogonality Testing with Inner-Product Functional Encryption
Each function is described by a predicate vector ~̃y ∈ Z`p and a message vector ~y ∈ [0, B]d, takes as input a pair(
~̃x ∈ Z`p \ {0}, ~x ∈ [0, B]d
)
, and returns ~x>~y if ~̃x
>
~̃y = 0. The partial information is part(~̃x, ~x) = ~̃x.
– Param: returns the parameters (d`+ 1, |ct| = 1, |sk| = n+ 1).
– EncCt(~x, ~̃x): returns a matrix C ∈ Z(d`+2)×dp such that C>(w0, u, ~w1, . . . , ~w`) = W~̃x + w0~x ∈ Zdp, where
W ∈ Zd×`p denotes the matrix whose i’th column is ~wi, for all i ∈ [`].
– EncKey(~y, ~̃y): returns a matrix K ∈ Z(d`+2)×`p such that K>(w0, u, ~w1, . . . , ~w`) = W>~y + u~̃y ∈ Z`p.
– Decode(~x, ~y): if ~x>~y = 0, it returns the vector ~d := (~y, ~̃x) ∈ Zd+`p .
Correctness. Let ~̃x, ~̃y ∈ Z`p such that ~̃x
>
~̃y = 0, ~x, ~y ∈ [0, B]d, C := EncCt(~x, ~̃x), K := EncKey(~y, ~̃y) and
~d := Decode(~̃x, ~̃y, ~y). We have (w0, u, ~w1, . . . , ~w`)>(C|K)~d = ~y>(W~̃x + w0~x) − (~y>W + u~̃y)~̃x = w0~x>~y,







, ~̃y ∈ Z`p, ~x0, ~x1, ~y ∈ [0, B]d, for all b ∈ {0, 1}, Cb := EncCt(~xb, ~̃x
b









= 0, then it must be that ~y>~x0 = ~y>~x1. In that case, security relies on the fact that the following are
identically distributed: W and W+w0(~x1 − ~x0)~v>, where W←R Zd×`p , and ~v ∈ Z`p is an arbitrary vector such that
~̃x
>






















, with W ←R Zd×`p and u ←R Zp. The left most distribution corresponds to
(w0, u, ~w1, . . . , ~w`)
>(C0|K) whereas the rightmost distribution corresponds to (w0, u, ~w1, . . . , ~w`)>(C1|K).
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C.3 Fully-hiding Orthogonality Testing with Inner-Product Functional Encryption
Each function is described by a predicate vector ~̃y ∈ Z`p and a message vector ~y ∈ [0, B]d, takes as input a pair(
~̃x ∈ Z`p \ {0}, ~x ∈ [0, B]d
)
, and returns ~x>~y if ~̃x
>
~̃y = 0. There is no partial information: part(~̃x, ~x) = ∅.
– Param: returns the parameters (2d+ d`, |ct| = 1, |sk| = n+ 1).
– EncCt(~x, ~̃x): returns a matrix C ∈ Z(2d+d`+1)×(d`+d)p such that C>(w0, ~u,~v, vect(W)) = (vect(~u~̃x
>
+W), ~u+
w0~x) ∈ Zdp, where for any matrix M ∈ Zn×mp , we denote by vect(M) ∈ Znmp the vector such that for all ~x ∈ Znp ,
~y ∈ Zmp , vect(M)>(~x⊗ ~y) = ~x>M~y. Here, ~u,~v ←R Zdp, and W←R Zd×`p .
– EncKey(~y, ~̃y): returns a matrix K ∈ Z(2d+d`+1)×1p such that K>(w0, ~u,~v, vect(W)) = ~y>W~̃y + ~y>~v ∈ Zp.
– Decode(~̃y, ~y): it returns the vector ~d := (~y ⊗ ~̃y, ~y,−1) ∈ Zd`+d+1p .
Correctness. Let ~̃x, ~̃y ∈ Z`p such that ~̃x
>
~̃y = 0, ~x, ~y ∈ [0, B]d, C := EncCt(~x, ~̃x), K := EncKey(~y, ~̃y) and ~d :=











, ~̃y ∈ Z`p, ~x0, ~x1, ~y ∈ [0, B]d, for all b ∈ {0, 1}, Cb := EncCt(~xb, ~̃x
b









= 0, then it must be that ~y>~x0 = ~y>~x1. In that case, security relies on the fact that the following are









6= 0, then we show that (w0, ~u,~v, vect(W))>(Cb|K) is independent of b, using the
fact that the following are identically distributed: (W, ~v) and (W + ~u(~x1 − ~x0)>, ~v + w0(~x1 − ~x0)), with W ←R




b, ~y>W~̃y+~y>~v) whereas the rightmost distribution corresponds to (vect(W), ~v, ~y>W~̃y+





). If ~y = 0, then the gray term in the last distribution disappears, which means the





different from 0, that means the gray term itself is uniformly random over Zp, independent of b.
C.4 Ciphertext-policy ABE for Read-once Monotone Span Programs with Inner-Product Functional
Encryption
Each function is described by a characteristic vector ~a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ {0, 1}n, and a vector ~y ∈ [O,B]d. It takes
as input an access structure, which is a matrix M ∈ Zn×`p , and a vector ~x ∈ [0, B]d and outputs ~x>~y if the vector
(1, 0, . . . , 0)> ∈ Z1×`p is in the row span of M~a, which denotes the collection of vectors {Mj : aj = 1} where Mj
denotes the j’th row of M. That is, ~a satisfies M if there exists constants ω1, . . . , ωn ∈ Zp such that∑
j:aj=1
ωjMj = (1, 0, . . . , 0) (3)
Observe that the constants {ωj}j∈[n] can be computed in time polynomial in the size of the matrix M via Gaussian
elimination.
The partial information is: part(~a, ~x) = ~a.
– Param: returns the parameters (2d+ d`, |ct| = 1, |sk| = n+ 1).
– EncCt(~x,M): returns a matrix C ∈ Z2dn×d(n+1)p such that C>(w0, ~v, vect(U), ~w1, . . . , ~wn) = ((~v|U)M1 +
~w1, . . . , (~v|U)Mn + ~wn, ~v + w0~x) ∈ Zd(n+1)p . Here, ~v ←R Zdp, ~wi ←R Zdp for all i ∈ [n], and U←R Zd×np .
– EncKey(~y,~a): returns a matrix K ∈ Z2dn×dnp such that K>(w0, ~v, vect(U)) = (~w1a1, . . . , ~wnan) ∈ Zdnp .
– Decode(~̃y, ~y): it returns the vector ~d := (−~yω1a1, . . . ,−~yωnan, ~y, ~yω1, . . . ~yωn) ∈ Z2dn+dp .
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Correctness. Let ~a ∈ {0, 1}n ant M ∈ Zn×`p such that ~a satisfies M, ~x, ~y ∈ [0, B]d, C := EncCt(~x,M), K :=









>(~v|U)Mj = w0~x>~y, where the
last equality uses (3).
Security. Let ~a ∈ {0, 1}n, ~x0, ~x1, ~y ∈ [0, B]d, M ∈ Zn×`p , for all b ∈ {0, 1}, Cb := EncCt(~xb,M), K :=
EncKey(~y,~a). If ~a satisfies M, then ~x0 = ~x1 and there is nothing to prove.
If ~a doesn’t satisfies M then we show that (w0, ~v, vect(U), ~w1, . . . , ~wn)>(Cb|K) is independent of b, using the
fact that for all ~a ∈ {0, 1}n, the following are identically distributed : {~wi}i∈[n] and {~wi + (ai − 1)(~v|U)Mi}i∈[n],
with ~wi ←R Zdp for all i ∈ [n], ~v ←R Zdp, and U←R Z
d×(n−1)
p . The leftmost distribution corresponds to
(Cb|K)>(w0, ~v, vect(U), ~w1, . . . , ~wn) :=(
(~v|U)M1 + ~w1, . . . , (~v|U)Mn + ~wn, ~v + w0~xb
)
whereas the rightmost distribution corresponds to:(
a1(~v|U)M1 + ~w1, . . . , an(~v|U)Mn + ~wn, ~v + w0~xb
)
.
Since ~a does not satisfies M, we have: (a1(~v|U)M1, . . . , an(~v|U)Mn) is independent of ~v, which can be used to
mask w0~x0. Formally, that means the following are identically distributed: (a1(~v|U)M1 + ~w1, . . . , an(~v|U)Mn +
~wn, ~v + w0~x
0) and (a1(~v|U)M1 + ~w1, . . . , an(~v|U)Mn + ~wn, ~v + w0~x1).
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